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Well, this then gave no arguments for continuous movement, p-long movements are simpliciter no movements (continuous movement not exists, but movement (initiated by thrusts or attraction (or by E in E-contractions)) then occurs (discontinuously) per "jump", at least dp long, of course both in terms of thrust-movement and attraction-movement; That thrusts (collisions) between mx only cause "jumps" is more intuitive than that mx must "rest" (at least dt)^ between each "jump" if mx is constantly attracted, but, so it then rationally must be).
***** Single thrusted mx then "jumps", in accordance with the "empiri", at least reasonably in the same direction as thrusting mx "jumps", by which of course movement of mx not has to be linear, assume that mx movements not are linear. But that it is required that mx more belong to a group of mx, which as a group (at least reasonably, sufficiently) move together, for it to be a matter of more linear movement; Single mx which are thrusted for example close to the Earth's surface, "falls", are directly attracted towards the Earth's surface, outside a particle cannon perhaps. This is verified by "empirical" experiments, smaller particles (consisting of fewer mx) are scattered quite widely when they especially are thrusted through slits (they form an interference pattern as it is called, a shadow pattern, where the wall between the open slits (through which the particles passes, those that get through the slits) gives rise to shadows, areas which fewer particles hit (which if it is a matter of (equivalently) light can be said to be darker), on a plate behind the slits). Larger particles (consisting of more mx) move more linear (not gives rise to this shadow pattern, if large enough).
^ Every mx-"jump", and every "rest" shorter than dt time, takes in accordance with t2 max tp time, assume that an mx "jumps" twice, where each "jump" takes tp time, and is d(p’,p] respective d[p,p’’) long, and that mx "rests" tp time between the "jumps" (in p), which defines, where tp then defines the time for the first "jump", tp’ the time for the "rest", and tp’’ the time for the second "jump":
tp+tp’+tp’’=tp; t2.
A tp-"rest" is with this no "rest", but the whole is about a momentarily "jump" between p’ and p’’, thus d(p’,p’’) long:
"Rests" must be at least dt-long.
Not assuming T1
If Nothing is assumed to be able to exist (T1 not is assumed), then a number of existential possibilities opens up, especially for Einstein's cosmology, see further below, which specifically not needs to be addressed (then with the exception of Einstein's theories, which only are addressed because they are conventionally believed in), but the analysis can stick to the basics regarding this, namely that d(p,p’) not exists, that Nothing exists between p and p’ if only these two p's are assumed to exist. Which intuitively is completely absurd: if p and p’ exists in different positions (in the same dimension) then it intuitively just only exists a distance (space) between p and p’. But that is of course principally not the case if it (in a principle) is assumed/defined that it does not (T1 not is assumed):
p,p’; p,p’ÎE, d(p,p’)ÏE:
p]≠p).
The latter is intuitive, because intuitive there is a distance already between p] and p), thus between p and one on p immediately following p(≠p), thus that p]≠p), but this thus not is valid if continuity is valid/prevails(/rules), in which case then p]=p), there not prevails (exists) a distance between p] and p), which is intuitive, since a distance of course (intuitive) prevail (exists) between p] and p) if p]≠p) (contradicting the continuity), and moreover it is then valid in accordance with Lp (t1). So those who want to assume this that p]≠p) must consequently reject Lp, which almost wipes out the possibility of mathematical definition (since Lp is an incredibly fundamental principle in mathematics). Yes, this is not easy, even if T1 is assumed, it is hard to digest that p]=p), but at the same time not, it is then about continuity, that there must not be a gap (consisting of Nothing) between p and the closest (to p) next p, but then that p]=p). This mathematical shows that mathematics has consistency problems, especially if it assumes that p]≠p). The Fundamental logic (the theory in the previous sections) commonly not fall into that mathematical problem, because it just only assumes that continuity prevails, primarily in accordance with T1, sees p as pure abstraction, something only thought, which as a concept may have its value, but just as well has no value.
Albert Einstein's (1879-1955) cosmology further then, defined in the so-called theories of relativity (1905-1915), are something of the most mysterious that ever have been seen, pure mystery,* which can be blamed on misinterpretation of experiments, see further next paragraph, but given their expression, apparition they already intuitively should have been rejected (although there are some that is rationally in the theories of relativity (even in the most irrational theory there can be a grain of rationality)). And given the E-theory, or especially T1, it is a simple matter to confute the theories of relativity, because they assume the Universe to be surrounded by Nothing, which then simpliciter not is the case (not is valid) given T1; More specifically according to Einstein the Universe is a string mollusc ("bezugsmolluske"), a light snake or light worm which (dynamically) so to speak coil in the humus of Nothing, forcing Nothing out, an extrusion called spacetime(=Universe). A spacetime which of course simpliciter not exists if it not is surrounded by Nothing, yes, if spacetime not is surrounded by Nothing, displacing Nothing, then of course E exists, and "spacetime" is phenomenon in E, especially then mx, and thus nothing special, especially nothing created, because created spacetime of course presupposes Nothing, that spacetime can be created, arise from/in Nothing, then creating spacetime (in/extruding Nothing). The Universe as a string mollusc, well, more absurd have to be searched for.
Einstein assumes that light not is captured by gravitation (or at least not completely), which it rationally on the contrary simpliciter is. The latter which means that there is no fundamental difference between (on Earth) measuring the speed of light as for example measuring the speed of a ball, which in turn means that no difference in the speed of light can be measured from which direction (at which "angle") light than falls into (and through) a stationary measuring device (which measures the speed of light), which is exactly what experiments also show. But given Einstein's assumption that light not is captured by gravitation defines the theories of relativity. More specifically, given this Einsteinian assumption and that no variation in the speed of light (c) can be measured by these stationary measuring devices ("interferometers"), four possibilities are valid:
1) No movement at all occurs (light and everything else is completely still).
2) Only the light(/the photons)** moves, everything else is still (the light shines over a still, immobile world).
3) Everything moves in the same direction (the light, the pastor, the space rocket as the planet).
4) Everything is light, which (with c) moves in the same direction (the light, the pastor, the space rocket and the planet are light (spacetime is this light, the pastor (on Earth)/planet is more compact light/spacetime than the pastor/planet surrounding spacetime ("air"/"space"))).
Einstein chose alternative 4, given which it is straightforward to define the theories of relativity, provided the existence of Nothing, because if Nothing not is assumed to exist, "spacetime" of course only is flaming light in E so to speak. To show a little how Einstein defines, everything is then light (according to Einstein), with which it outmost can focus on a beam of light, whose length is L:
L=tc; t=[norm time], c=[speed of light].
Then in the so-called special theory of relativity, Einstein defines fictitious deviation from this actual movement (of norm):
I) t’c=th; t’=[fictitious time (for m)], h=[fictitious speed (for m)]; m=mass (a bundle of light rays).
Thus that t’ increases if h increases, that time for m goes slower so that m not arrives before itself, and vice versa (because m then actually moves with c, only fictitiously moves with h). Which Einstein calls time dilatation (more rational is actually to define the opposite, that tc=t’h, thus that t’ decreases when h increases, that time for m goes faster so that m not arrives before itself, and vice versa).
I rewritten (mathematically, Einstein takes mathematics for granted (as something valid in the (real) world)):
l=th2 /c; l=t’h.
Initially for two m, m and m’, over l and l’ respectively it is assumed that l=l’(=th’2 /c):
dl/dh’>0.
Which if h increases, which is the same as h’ (for m’) decreases, defines that l decreases, which Einstein calls length contraction.
Given I further can be defined:
L=t’c2 /h:
II) mL=mc2 t’/h.
Where mL defines that what Einstein calls bezugsmolluske, string mollusc, an m over its path (then of length L), and since m is light, this of course can be seen as a (coiling) light snake or light worm.
II can be rewritten:
mhhL/t'h=mc2:
III) ph=mc2; p=mh, t’h=L:
dm/dh>0.
The mass thus increases if h increases, and vice versa, which Einstein calls the mass effect.
And III can further well known be written:
E=mc2; E=ph.
This is strange in so many ways, first and foremost because the h-movements are fictitious? In some way it's well about Einstein wanting to connect the string molluscs with how we perceive the "empiri", but it is still the c-movement that is the real one (according to Einstein then)? If we perceive reality wrong, then it is in no way right to bring this wrongful perception into the world definition. This Einstein corrects in the so-called general theory of relativity in which the fictitious aspect is removed, it is only seen to the actual c-movement, which he assumes to be slower in thicker, more compact, bundles of light, and vice versa: the c-movement goes faster in less compact light bundles. A compactness Einstein defines g (gravitation) for: The more compact (light bundles), the higher g, and vice versa, which then of course defines c to be a function of g:
c=c(g); dc/dg<0.
Well, then of course it is possible to specify/define further, but it is content with this, it is evident that this is extremely strange, and has nothing to do with how we "empirically" perceive reality. I'm not a stranger to the fact that we can misperceive reality (take for example that that mx "jumps"; Most people well perceives(/assumes) that x moves continuously through space, but thus (rationally) not), but there are limits. Is it unappealing to assume that the Earth's g-field captures, "glues" photons (or to assume T1), then a direct proof of the existence of relative speed of light must be performed. Perhaps by putting a c-meter in the nose of a space rocket and gas max towards the Sun and measuring the speed of incident sunlight. Or maybe build a long rotating arm at the outer end of which a c-measuring instrument measures the speed of incident laser light. Unless in particular the c-meter "glues" the light, which not is very likely, then it should measure relative speed of light and Einstein's theories of relativity be confuted.
__________ * Quantum mechanics is usually claimed to be strange, but in comparison to the theories of relativity it is a miracle of clarity, it overdefines however (can rationally be stated without further ado), especially concerning the number of mx, the E-theory then only sees one kind of mx, quantum mechanics currently sees 61 different kinds of mx (see the last reference). And quantum mechanics defines a little strange sometimes, especially when it comes to the wobbly movement of small particles: To define this wobbliness quantum mechanics define a "wave function", which they want to make to that the particle in itself is a wave (so-called wave/particle-duality), well, of course particles consisting of many mx perhaps can be smeared out into a "wave", but the particles in question are very small, with which it in that case consequently only can be the matter of small "waves". Sees the particles={mx} being "waves" not be constituted of {mx}, then it of course is the matter of mv (E-theoretically), the particles have thus then been completed, which they in the context not have. Sees the particles being "waves" being something non-material (non-mx(≠mv); Especially then an mx can be transformed into this non-mx="wave"), then the quantum mechanics have ended up in the mystique together with the theories of relativity.^
Quantum mechanics also wants to see "virtual particles" endogenously be able to "suck up" mv, no, not in accordance with the E-section. They assume that in context of an assumption that x+(-x)=0 ("annihilation"), mostly just a strange assumption: E-theoretically mx may perhaps "annihilate", cleave and complete each other, if many/several mx "jumps" in to each other. Two mx cannot "annihilate", cleave each other, then no thrust-movement would exist (contradicting "the empiri"), but mx-cleaving ("annihilation") consequently requires that several mx "jumps" in to each other, in the same place, in the same position ("p"). And even if two mx could cleave each other, that possibility depends on mx (self)weight (the number of mv mx consists of) and compactness (how centred mx ({mv}(=mx)) is around a position), that possibility simply depends on the "brute force" of mx, not on some mysterious plus or minus (x and anti-x). And given that mx are exactly equal (which they then rationally are), it can only be about cleaving (and completion), or not, of both mx. And provided that thrust-movement is possible, then thus two mx which "jumps" into each other not cleaves each other, but they then thrusts (on) each other.
Another assumption quantum mechanics makes difficult to accept, is that particles apart from "communication" between thrusting and thrusted mx (when they are superpositionally superimposed on each other), also can "communicate" with each other at a distance from each other ("entanglement"), and this momentarily(/immediately) (principally on time≤tp), which means at infinite speed, which given T2 simpliciter not is possible (it defines these particles to be E). If it is a matter of finite speed, then it is a matter of out-sent a, with which it E-theoretically must be a matter of large (very advanced) "particles". That mx can "communicate" with other mx at a distance from each other can E-theoretically without further ado be excluded (because mx E-theoretically are "dead" entities).
** To talk about "photons", particles is actually wrong, it is more about a homogeneous "sausage", more compact in brighter areas, and less compact in less bright areas, and Nothing where no light "flows". Physicists therefore speak of fields rather than particles, although they also use the concept of particles, particles which are assumed to be points (to their shape), with which they in one way avoid that the theory is contradictory, but the "fields" with this only consists of points, varying compactness not exists, which so to speak requires that p can exist (superpositionally) superimposed, equivalently to how mv in the E-theory are assumed to be able to exist superimposed and define mx, which mathematically simpliciter not is possible, or rather absurd, since more compact p in accordance with t2 consequently requires that an infinite number of p must be superimposed in order for a more compact p to be defined, which by extension means that more compact areas in/of the string mollusc must consist of an infinite number of superimposed light rays, which of course just only is absurd.
^ The equivalent of course also are valid for mx, which "smeared out" of course principally are extremely small "waves", yes, given that mx "jumps" (and Up’’’), they simply not are "waves", but unchanged mx, how mx now looks like, in their different positions (if any). And furthermore then single mx cannot move, but for that it then is required that mx exists in group with other mx, so that a Fr-movement can be formed, but single mx is then perhaps only attracted towards something, for example then towards the Earth if they were to come outside an mx-canon.
Addition
So-called Classical logic assumes very restricted (narrow-minded), contradicting Ia och Ib:
N*) x ® y.
Thus that a unique x implicates a unique y, which (implicatively identically) also can be written:
N*’) (x ® y)=(y Ú x’),(x Ú y’).
This in accordance with an assumption Classical logic makes, called the Negation, which all underlying assumptions Classical logic makes defines:
N) x=y(=x’=y); y=x(=y’=x); x,y≠0, (x Ú y)=(x Ù y)’:
z=x,y.
N implicates N* och N*’, albeit in more strict(/restricted) meaning than what N* and N*’ defines, implicatively identically it is given N valid that [or including some additional Classically logically fundamentally: T) N=(x « y),(x ® y),(y ® x),x,y=N(; N)]:
N=(x ® y):
"N*") x ® y.
That it Classically logically is a matter of greater strictness is shown by the (Classically logical) proof of "N*’":
"N*’") (x ® y)=y,x=(y Ú y),(x Ú x)=(y Ú x’),(x Ú y’); N(/T), Tp;
Tp) x=¦(x); ¦(x)=x.
Tp is a tautological principle Classical logic assumes, which then especially defines that y=(y Ú y); Tp is not identical whit Up’; Tp defines (possible) existence of superclones, Up’ excludes existence of superclones.
Classically logically "N*’" is over-interpreted to define N*’, N*’ in which it not is given that x’=y and that y’=x, which then is valid in accordance whit N. Such over-interpretation (which is legion in Classical logic) is not the big problem with Classical logic, but that is the assumption of the equivalent to the immensely restricted N*, then contradicting Ia and Ib, and then defined through N. N that Classical logic more rigorously can be stated to assume through that Classical logic assumes the so-called Law of double negation (Dl), because N is a necessary presumption för (the validity of) Dl (provided that Dl not is assumed ad hoc (to assume Dl ad hoc is unserious)), which the following proof of Dl shows given N, because given N it is then valid that:
x’=y and that y’=x (both sentences symmetrically valid, thus also reversely valid):
(y’)’=y, (x’)’=x (x=y’ in-substituted in x’=y, and y=x’ in-substituted in y’=x):
Dl) x’’=x, y’’=y.
It is thus (the assumption of) N that results in Dl (proof-wise).
The foregoing is enough to confute Classical logic, and for that matter of the so-called Intuitionistic logic, which weaker than Classical logic defines the following concerning N:
N’) x=y; ((y=x)).
Thus that x implicatively identically is (implicates) y, bur that y not necessarily implicatively identically is (implicates) x, the reversed can also be defined, for which there is no (conventional) name:
N’’) ((x=y)); y=x.
Given Ia and Ib both N’ end N’’, except N then, are false, a binding, relation between different x in the way that N/N’/N’’ defines simpliciter not exists (other than as a false x in the brain convolutions), an example:
x can give z, or nothing at all (x ® x), if x at all be to hand, prevails, x ® y can only be a rule/"law" which not is fulfilled (for the moment (x=0)). And y can be given(/implicated) by å, which overall can be defined:
(x ® y)o=((å ® y)u Ù ((x ® z))), where o defines unfulfilled rule and u defines fulfilled rule.
This then especially to compare with the Classically logical equivalent to N*’ ("N*’").
Classically logically it complicates in the most horrible way, why the foregoing Classically logically simply not is seen, which can be exemplified by Jan Łukasiewicz's proof of Dl (then to be compared with the Dl-proof above) at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_negation, it presupposes in particular the following four sentences:
1) x=(y ® x).
2) (x ® (y ® z ))=((x ® y) ® (x ® z)).
3) (x’ ® y’)=(y ® x).
4) x=((x ® y) ® y).
1 and 3 trivially directly follows from N:
1) N=x,(y ® x), so x=(x ® y).
3) Well, it is then valid that x’=y and y’=x in accordance with N, with which 3 (the "Transposition") trivially follows.
4 presupposes Tp as well, except then N:
4) x=y=(y ® y)=((x ® y) ® y)(; N=y,(x ® y), so y=(x ® y)).
And then 2:
(x ® y)=(x ® y)(; N=(x ® y)=N; N, so (x ® y)=(x ® y)):
(x ® (y ® y))=((x ® y) ® (x ® y)); Tp:
2) (x ® (y ® z))=((x ® y) ® (x ® z)); z=y.
z, or any other x (ex ante) ≠x,y, which given N (ex post, after assumption of N) of course is x or y:
z=x,y.
Especially this is "hidden" or simply not is seen in N-logic, because it complicates, so that then this that z=x,y is kept hidden. With which z is believed to be something other than x or y, which of course defines something much more complex than if it only is about x and y, which it then only is given N, N-logic (Classical logic) commonalize (over-interpret) thus in a treacherously way, because it doesn't understand better (hopefully, otherwise it is of course a matter of fraud).
To also take the two "hypothetical syllogisms" at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_syllogism#As_a_metatheorem that Łukasiewicz presupposes in his proof of Dl, for the sake of enlightenment:
(y ® y)=(((x ® y) ® (x ® y)):
HS1) (y ® z)=(((x ® y) ® (x ® z)); z=y.
(x ® y)=((x ® y) ® (x ® y)):
(x ® y)=((y ® y) ® (x ® y))(; N):
HS2) (x ® y)=((y ® z) ® (x ® z)); z=y.
That Lp-formulas, to lastly also take two distributive formulas:
x=(x Ù x)=(x Ù y)=(x Ù (y Ú y))=(x Ù (y Ú z)); z=y.
x=(x Ú x)=((x Ù x) Ú (x Ù x))=((x Ù y) Ú (x Ù y))=((x Ù y) Ú (x Ù z)); z=y.
So:
(x Ù (y Ú z))=((x Ù y) Ú (x Ù z)).
x=(x Ú x)=(x Ú y)=(x Ú (y Ù y))=(x Ú (y Ù z)); z=y.
x=(x Ù x)=((x Ú x) Ù (x Ú x))=((x Ú y) Ù (x Ú y))=((x Ú y) Ù (x Ú z)); z=y.
So:
(x Ú (y Ù z))=((x Ú y) Ù (x Ú z)).
All this (which then follows from primarily N) then Łukasiewicz presupposes before he even so to speak begins to prove Dl, with which the whole of course appears to be very complicated, and in its own way it of course is, but then self-created complexity, because directly starting from N it is thus easy as a pie to prove Dl.
Anyway, the foregoing shows that extremely much can be defined based on/given N, but N is thus (rationally) completely false, with which these derivations are equally false, however much they may seem to define something that makes sense. But if any of these formulas are to be used in logical analysis, then they have to be argued for per se, each formula (ex ante) be ascertained if it is relevant to assume in some context, or not. To assume them valid on the basis of N is (rationally) simpliciter not possible, but they then must so to say stand on their own legs, (ex ante) be argued for to do so, be rational (intuitive) in the context in which they perhaps are assumed (to be valid); Such "simple" principle as Lp for example is extremely complicated to see (analyse) the validity of in specific contexts, for example if [x+z=y+z]=[x=y], because directly interpreted this sentence is naturally not valid, the left term is de facto not identically the right term, unless y=x, in which case the relation trivially is valid (given Up/Ip), but what if y≠x ‒ the more normal regarding this with x and y. If y=x, then it mostly is meaningless to define "y", mostly just confusing, if now then y=x, in which case it then most rationally is to stick to x(=y=x), the only exception is when rewriting identities, especially mathematically a common method of arriving at conclusions, simply then by rewriting identities (with help of the principles which are assumed to fit for that) ‒ is the [x=y]-relation in some meaning remaining if z is added to x and y respectively? For example, is father+mother=child+mother identically father=child? No, hardly, but it really needs to be analysed if this Lp-principle can be seen as valid/rational in some context.
By way of conclusion concerning Classical logic, it defines the following "Truth table" in accordance with N, to be compared with the rational table in the introduction section:
x y true false false true
This table which then shall be interpreted in accordance with N, which primarily is irrational in two ways: the N*-perspective, that (unique) x ® (unique) y, then contradicting Ia and Ib, and the (x,y≠0)-perspective, that there always is a unique true y if x is false, then contradicting that there can be completely false x; The assumption that x,y≠0 can Classical logic be argued to make because N is difficult to justify if x or y can be 0: x’=0 or 0’=x; x≠0, for which x’(=non-x) defines 0, and which x defines (is defined by) 0’(=non-0)? Secondarily there is an "eye"-perspective underlying N, that the "eye" finds, sees the relevant non-x among all the irrelevant non-x, which Classically logically usually is defined: If x is a proposition, then also x’ is a proposition, for example defined on page 68 of Language Proof and Logic, or page 97 of Principia Mathematica (â1.7), which only is absurd. There is no such connection/relation between different x, neither mentally (in that case it is about some prejudice) nor "platonistic", that it only (eternal) is so, which just only is even more absurd than that there is a mental connection between different words, concepts, that there in the language are eternally given connections between different words, concepts. Which not prevents especially Kurt Gödel (1906-1978), with his incompleteness theorems (contradicting FT), from still being a platonist, commonly in the meaning that theories X can exist equivalent empirically, thus per se (beyond especially the human's consciousness), and certainly, if the existence of platonistical X is thought, it is a fairly given thought that these X just only may define (undecidable/independent) x, without them being either provable or disprovable, without being axioms. But rationally, again (more rigorously of course in accordance with FT), this is only nonsense, it is the consciousness that defines X, nothing is determined/defined before it is determined/defined, see further the section Concerning FT in Addition II.
Given the E-theory the only rational alternative for 0=[no x(≠0)] is void/room ({mv}), with which it for example (superclonically, contradicting Up’) can be defined that x-x=0, with the evident interpretation that if x is excluded from itself only empty space remains. For 0 to not cause problems in analysis, the best is to assume 0 to be idempotent, so that the right side in following example still is 0:
∞(x-x)=∞0=0.
Because if 0 for example is assumed to be p (principally, as part of empty space p's are empty space), then of course ∞0=dp, something unintuitively arises; And of course even more so if 0>p, for example a volume, non-idempotent volume, with which of course x0>0; x>1.
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