E’=E:

 

T2) E=∞*:

 

x<∞*; x≠E; xÎE.

 

To buy T2 the previous (logical) reasoning of course must be bought, be bought that it must be kept to what is defined, that it is "forbidden" to (contradictorily) go against it, to both assume something and not assume it:

 

R2) What is assumed ((to be) true), is assumed (to be true): It is contradictory (false) to define x’ to be valid for x if x is assumed (to be true).

 

And is that bought, well, then simpliciter T2 is valid (given T1); R2 is a more common assumption than Kp (which then presupposes Up).

 

And given T2 it is then "only" to define further, in which especially then Up’’’ (E-theoretically) is assumed, that equal (different) x also are equal, especially that a cluster of mx in (pure) room positioned in exactly the same way as another cluster of mx are exactly the same, except then for position.

 

Yes, given the E-theory it is completely natural to (commonly) assume Up (for all forms of x (thus generally)), that for example the previous exactly equal clusters of mx are one and the same cluster of mx if "they" exists in the (exactly) same position.

 

And Up’’ too, and that almost without the need to drag T1 in, it is just only (it is evident) irrational to see a cluster of mx holistically/meridioistically being able to be something more/less than this cluster of mx.

 

And if Up’’ is assumed to be valid in E, then it is just only absurd to more commonly assume that FT not is valid, because it is E that is empirically important, not what the thought not E-wise can concoct.

 

Again, this basic is not hard, complicated (once found), there is simply not much of alternatives. That the world would be so incredibly complicated is simply not true, that can only the mind that so to speak not has thought through think.

 

 

A little more about consciousness

 

Excluded that consciousness (M) is nothing (M≠0), there are commonly primarily four possibilities (for which there are a variety of more specific concepts in the literature (look up the concept of philosophy of mind)):

 

1) M={mx}(; mx≠0).

 

2) M=x; x={mx}+q(; mx,q≠0; q≠mx).

 

q can commonly either be (exogenously) added to x, or (synthetically, combinatory, endogenously) occur in x. The latter which of course contradicts T1 (q arises out of Nothing), then given that it not are about mx (q especially not is something mx sends out). If M not is a combination of mx and q, then there are two possibilities:

 

3) M=q; qÎx.

 

4) M=q; ((qÎx)).

 

In 3 M then only is(/are) q, but mx are a necessary condition for q, which mx not are in 4, q can (perhaps) exist freely, unbound to mx in case 4. q is commonly either a "large" (unitary, homogeneously) q, or consisting of smallest q (mq, equivalent to mx). Given the E-theory (I in section E), all mx are exactly equal, there exists no q≠mx.* But if that is disregarded (in the same way as Physics disregards it, by assuming the existence of lots of different kinds of "mx"), then by that primarily two different kinds of "substances" can exist: consciousness-x=q(/mq) and non-consciousness-x=mx. Given these two different "substances", it can of course further be discussed around them, especially concerning if q must be laid down into x={mx} by someone/something in order for x to become an M. Given the E-theory of course all such discussion is nonsense, it is simpliciter 1 that is valid, M is just only the cluster of mx ({mx}). But if the E-theory not is assumed, especially given that Physics opens up for the existence of different "substances", then it is not particularly strange that a discussion about whether q exists can arise, which it obviously has done, and it thrives quite well yet to this day, at the time of writing (not least (mind) philosophically), thus if there is any fundamental difference between M and mx, if M is something (holistically) beyond {mx} (which M then not is in accordance with the E-theory).

 

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* Or if so wishes all mx=q, but given that it in accordance with the "empiri" exists unconscious x, it is more rational to define these x consist of mx than of q (that q=mx), thus to not introduce the concept of consciousness already at mx-level, M perhaps arises later, is the (moving) interaction between mx (which then consists of compressed room, which it is absurd to see something conscious-wise in, even if the potential, the possibility of consciousness exists in mx, in accordance withT1, but it then maybe manifested first in some mx-constellation).

 

Morals

 

Given T1 of course all (possible) morals exists as possibilities, even so if E is completely empty, in which case the morals of course has no significance whatsoever. Which it neither does at mx-level, or at unconscious x(={mx})-level, in which case mx/x just only are in the way mx/x are, without (self)reflection. But it is first for somewhat reflective, conscious x that morals have any significance. The more the less reflective can be claimed; The less reflective tends of course towards the completely unreflective/unconscious, by which it tends towards dogmatism/programming (if x acts in certain way in what can be defined to be (are) moral choices). And consequently morals have the least programmatic/dogmatic significance if all moral possibilities can be seen. Even if it in this latter case really comes down to choosing (between moral choices, requires an effort). The least the hermit has to choose, and the most the one in a social context. For social contexts it can be defined what is seen to be good for it per se, independent of its members (the collective is more important than the individual), which (of course) results in moral rules that the community sees all individuals in it must follow. Or on the contrary the individual can be defined to always precede society, the social construction, with which of course different moral rules results than if society, the social construction, is seen to precede the individual.

 

 

"Empirical" experiments

 

At least relatively clear "empirical" experiments are for example, that an apple sticks together, that there (perhaps) is a force that hold the apple together. That apples are falling to the Earth, that there (perhaps) is a force that makes that happen. That of other billiard balls thrusted billiard balls goes in different directions depending on how thrusting billiard balls hits the thrusted billiard balls, that there (perhaps) is a force that determines that. That x speed not is changed depending on the direction from which x passes or passes through a meter of x speed firmly anchored to the Earth's surface, given that x is "driven" at the same (own) speed, that x (perhaps) is "caught/glued" by the Earth's attraction force. That small particles which are shot away moves wobbly, especially if they are shot through slits, "larger" particles move more straight/rectilinear (for example laser light is a "larger" x, consists E-theoretically of more mx than "normal" light), which (perhaps) proves just that.

 

Concerning "entanglement" a relatively clear "empirical" experiment for such would be if it is valid that y a bit from x is affected if x is affected, without as it seems any "mx"-interaction between x and y is occurring, or that y is somehow preprogrammed to behave in a certain way in harmony with x, which colloquially is called telepathy.

 

Given the E-theory, "entanglement" simpliciter cannot occur; mx cannot as the ("dead") small things they are communicate with other mx, neither with infinite nor with finite speed, except when they in thrusts are superpositionally positioned with one another (and then per assumption in accordance with the "empiri" as thrusting mx pass directional information over to the thrusted mx). The latter gives rise to the idea that "mx" can be superpositionally positioned even if they exists in different positions, which of course defines a completely different space than the E-space, by which T1 in particular must be rejected, which rationally simpliciter not is possible.

 

The experiments which are claimed to prove "entanglement" and other quantum mechanical phenomena can by no means be claimed to be clear, it is about utterly complicated devices where particles (lots at the same time, or "single ones" (one after the other)) are shot in different paths, where the paths/ways can be closed off or opened up for the particles, particles which also usually by dividers (instruments in the way of the particles) can be divided, so that the parts go off in different directions (by which it E-theoretically of course not is the matter of mx, because mx (of course) cannot be divided (yes, if they are divided, then they of course are completed, and that is not the case, primarily cleavage, in these devices)). And then it is detected where the "particles" end up through detectors, and then an interpretation is made of all this, of what happens in the device, preferably based on something mathematically calculated.*

 

Mathematics which often is seen as something superior, neutral, which can be the basis for all kinds of reality, usually it Physically is about "classical", quantum mechanical and relativistical(/einsteinian) reality, then according to different (mathematical) definitions (which are based on different mathematically formulated axioms, which presupposes that the basic mathematics, rules of inference are equally valid in whatever reality it is about). Which rationally of course is completely wrong, it is reality that is superior, mathematics subordinate (subordinated the reality, mathematics is not neutral), and valid only if it can be seen to fit reality.

 

A reality which then primarily given Up and T1 is defined by the E-theory, if a reality other than the E-theory wants to be seen, it is first and foremost T1 that must be rejected, which rationally not is possible. But can any clear "empirical" experiment prove the invalidity of T1, then it rationally of course only is to bow to that. One such experiment would be to try to travel to the rand of the Universe,** the Universe maybe not is so insanely stretched in certain direction, and there see that it stops, that it not is possible to get beyond the rand, into Nothing; If it not is dead stop, but it is possible to get past the "rand", it is (of course) not a matter of Nothing beyond the "rand" (but of E that continues). In and for itself it can be the case, because the Universe forces Nothing out if Nothing exists around the Universe, that for example the arm that reaches into Nothing and displaces Nothing, stretches space out. Even if Nothing then principally contradictorily has the property of being able to be displaced, pushed, forced out, just as Nothing contradictorily has the property of not being able to be pushed, forced out, displaced by an arm if the arm cannot penetrate, push out Nothing. And if an arm cannot penetrate, push, force Nothing out, force Nothing away, can the Universe then do it? Well, it is probably simply so that T1 is valid.

 

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* Already the conventional interpretation of the Double-slit experiment is then E-theoretically highly questionable, so there is little point in more specifically getting into E-theoretical interpretations of these other quantum mechanical experiments, until it really is shown that there is something non-E-theoretically regarding the travel of shot particles between "canon" and surface (which perhaps is the basis for the interpretation of these other experiments, and in which case the E-theoretical interpretation (of wobbly particles) of course is false), which simply means to clearly show that there is no path for the particles between canon and surface, but that the particles "jump" randomly between canon and surface ("jumps" defined by the mathematical wave function, the "particle" is in all positions of the mathematical wave function before the random outcome on the surface as it usually quantum-mechanically is expressed), "jumps" longer than the extremely short "jumps" that it E-theoretically is about (on the wobbly path between cannon and surface for very small particles); Which of course principally can be seen if it can be brought down to "mx"-level, "mx" on its journey can be followed like a fly's journey can be followed.

 

** That that is impossible in accordance with the theories of relativity is of course only to ignore, theories cannot, must not prevent "empirical" experiments, attempts; According to the theories of relativity it is then only to (jointly) follow the light in its path (as a string mollusc), one is then part of light, a light flow in this larger flow of light, which then is the Universe, so only if one is at the edge toward Nothing of the Universe's flow of light it is perhaps possible to say something "empirical" about Nothing there beyond the Universe, beyond the edge/rand of the flow of light (which then is the Universe).

 

 

"N's" truth table again

 

Which then reads:

 

    x        y

 true  false

false   true

 

Which commonly interpreted, (then) shall be interpreted:

 

If x≥0 (per definition) is true, then all y(≠x) is false (for x).

 

If x≥0 (per definition) is false, then the following possibilities are valid:

 

x=0 is false or completely false: There exists at least one "replacer" y(≠0) which defines x(≠0, being) true; In this case completely false simpliciter defines a stronger conviction than if x merely is seen as false.

 

x≠0 is false: There exists at least one "replacer" y≥0 which defines x(≥0, being) true; If y=0 it of course only is a matter of one "replacer", and x is completely false (ex post; x=0).

 

x≠0 is completely false: There is no "replacer" y≠0 which defines x (being) true, but y(=x)=0 (ex post).

 

It is thus not quite simple to (rationally) interpret this table. To interpret it algorithmically, as a (general) simple rule structure, is in some extent possible as long as completely false x not is in the picture, it is about x,y≥0, where x or y just only can be false, there always is a (at least one) "replacer" (≥0) for a false x(≥0). But if y=0, provided that x(≠0) is false, then x is completely false and there is no point at all analysing x, analysis of whether x is x or y is completely meaningless (then because it is a matter of a completely false phenomenon (x), which no y (other than then 0) defines true), but for meaningful analysis there must be "replacers" ≠0, which in principle explains Classical logic's (N-logic's) assumption of just that, and further the reduction (from the previous commonly valid) to (the assumption of, the extremely restricted) N (which then defines it as just only standing between two (unique) alternatives, x and y). But, it (the existence of y≠0 given that x≠0 is false) then excludes the possibility that x can be completely false (that x=0 (ex post)), which simpliciter (rationally) cannot be ruled out (everyone probably are able to think of something (x) that they see is completely false, which they not in any way can see be defined as true (that x true is y(≠x,0)), can be "reversed" (by a "replacer" y(≠0) which defines x true) into something true).

 

Even that that it may be many "replacers", not just only one as then according to N, confutes N. In which case it of course (perhaps) is to choose a "replacer". A platonistical/empirical presupposition in (the assumption of) N can be discerned in this, because it given some platonistically or empirically existing x(≠0) is something (y≠0) that (categorically) defines x true. But nothing is then determined until it is determined, and moreover then it can be so that the definite, determined x≠0 (especially then an assumed platonistically/empirically x) turns out to be completely false (through some kind of revision), and thus x=y=0, which then further confutes N (which defines that that not is possible).

 

Concerning the most fundamental (again)

 

It is about definition right from the start (it is always about definition). Which especially is shown by that there are two ways to start, by which it definition-wise (of course) is about choosing (defining which alternative to start from) right from the start.

 

Which are then these two alternatives? Well, on one side there is a purely abstract, which begins in the distinction of Nothing=propertieslessness and Something≠Nothing, which further comes to the conclusion, because the property of being able to define (per definition) not exists in Nothing (as propertiesless), that definition perhaps exists in Something (the property of being able to define perhaps exists in Something, not in Nothing). Especially definition of what Something is, but definition of course exists in this purely abstract case already before such definition of Something, if any, then concerning the definition of the distinction between Nothing and Something; That this analysis comes to the conclusion that Something must exist in order for something to exist at all not changes that definition already exists before that conclusion, that definition exists already from the beginning, is with, is a being, already from the start (before the conclusion that Something must exist in order for a definition to exist).

 

On the other side there is an "empirical" alternative, which is based on the "sense-bubble", takes it for granted (it just only evident is something according to this alternative), for example the part of the bookshelf and open door that faint dark grey can be discerned in the otherwise compact dark when lying in bed before falling to sleep. Definition in this case is of course especially about defining words such as discern, darkness, bookshelf, door, bed, sleep, etcetera. To just take the "discerned", which of course is Something in accordance with the foregoing purely abstract case (had it been Nothing, flat Nothing would have prevailed, and nothing would have been discernible, especially not darkness (Nothing defined as propertiesless, and consequently not having the property darkness, or any other property)), for given, gives no greater guidance in an understanding of the discerned, but for that defining is needed, the discerned specifically be defined to be one or the other.

 

And as said, already before either of these two alternatives there is a choice of definition, a definition, namely then which of these two choices/alternatives which shall be taken as, be defined as starting point? Somewhere it may appear that the "empirical" alternative is the most rational to start from, start in, thus that there is a "sense-bubble", thoughts (a sense sphere), to start analysing/defining (out) from. But already that is then a definition, it goes just as well to start defining without that "sense-bubble assumption", to start in the purely abstract with the Nothing ‒ Something distinction (which is more of a "God perspective" than the "empirical" sense-bubble perspective, even if these two perspectives sooner or later merge, in that they deal with the same questions, the same questions sooner or later come up in both alternatives),  even if that starting point then comes to the conclusion that Something must exist in order for something to be defined, a Something which commonly however not needs to be a "sense-bubble" in the previous more specific meaning (as being a thought-sphere).*

 

Anyway, something is to hand, present, not Nothing, according to both of these alternatives, if it is possible to define (especially then these two alternatives). A definition which especially can ask itself the question if there are eternal (platonistical) phenomena? Well, it is of course a matter of definition. Given the E-theory there are eternal possibilities, which of course means that a thought perhaps can be taken up again, concerning p (points) for example, but are no p's thought, no p's exists either, because p's (then) not are empirical phenomenon in accordance with the E-theory, by which p not is an eternal phenomenon in platonistical meaning (only E is that (T2), of course including all (eternal; T1) possibilities that E defines, has, owns, so, if it is defined that platonistical x=possibility, possible x, that of course is valid, conventionally though platonistical x are equated with empirical x, although existing in different dimensions, they are seen to be factual phenomena, not only being possibilities (which become factual phenomena if they are thought or maybe are manifested as x={mx} which not are thoughts)), but the E-theory is of course definition. It can (of course, contradicting the E-theory) alternatively be defined that p's are platonistical (eternal) phenomena, empirical or non-empirical, just only (ad hoc) be assumed that that is the case, or after some form of argumentation. But of course, again, definition. It is always about definition:

 

Is it about, exists it just only some given x, beyond (all form of) definition, consciousness, awareness, then it (of course) does so (especially given Ip, but if Ip is assumed, then it of course is a matter of definition, with basis on the defined Ip, not a matter of some given x), and x can have significance (especially for an individual, thinking especially of some disease), but is x not defined (outmost through the definition/assumption that there exists given eternal x, but it is not possible to define a single such x), then x of course is that (not defined), not something conscious, not something defined, by which x simpliciter is unconscious, undefined, by which x of course is completely meaningless (until x maybe begins to be experienced (then maybe through a disease), and x with that of course can be given at least an introductory definition, maybe only x, but it is of course still a matter of a definition, albeit rudimentary). If x nevertheless, as completely unconscious, undefined, wants to be seen to have significance, be meaningful, then it again is a matter of some kind of definition (of x), for example then that x exists, but it is not possible to define a single x (more specifically), which specifically is a completely meaningless definition, then concerning (always) completely unconscious x. If it not is at hand, present in an existing definition, but then it of course already is a matter of a definition (about a definition in a definition):

 

To commonly want to give completely unconscious, undefined x (which in no way are more specifically defined, other than maybe commonly defined to exist, but without any specific definition whatsoever) meaning is completely meaningless.

 

Commonly are only more specifically defined x, albeit only rudimentarily defined x, meaningful x.

 

These two sentences are of course definition, just as it is definition to (contradicting these two sentences) define completely unconscious, undefined x to be meaningful x (that is to define the existence of an empiri, or of platonistical x, without specifically defining it/them):

 

Everything is definition.

 

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*  The Nothing – Something distinction is a much more common distinction than a direct assumption of a "sense-bubble", but the former assumption leads E-theoretically developed to the latter, then a "sense-bubble" defined to be a {mx}: Given an ad hoc assumption of a "sense-bubble" it can further be assumed that the "sense-bubble" is the one and only that can be trusted (Empiricism), but as already said must for meaningful analysis that which is experienced, assumed (x), be assumed to be that which is assumed, experienced (x=x), an "Ip"-principle must be assumed, otherwise x simpliciter not needs to be x (((x=x)), or identically: ((x≠x))): Rationalism is rationally what is valid. Which of course not means that the thought (rationally) is free to wander no matter how, but it really is about finding (out) what is rational, and this work then particularly important/fundamental finds Up.^

 

^ The "sense-bubble" either can be trusted, or not. It can be itself enough, or refer to, correspond to something else. And what is assumed to be valid then depends on the assumption(s), especially then on an "Ip"-assumption, that that which is assumed (regarding the "sense-bubble") is that which is assumed (regarding the "sense-bubble"). Intuitively "underlying" is something categorical valid regarding the "sense-bubble", maybe that it not exists, impossible to know, the "sense-bubble", or whatever it is that experiences, assumes (phenomena), just only knows (of) the assumptions (building on experience, experiencing (regarding the phenomena)) it makes (especially then E-theoretically, in accordance with the "sense-bubble" then is a {mx}).