Before any whit English as mother tongue has checked my text it is as it is.

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

 

Principles (of thought)

Lp

E

 

Not assuming T1

Addition

 

Literature

 

Addition II

Context Nothing

Think void instead of Nothing, and concerning mx

Concerning FT

Principia Mathematica

Principia Logico-Metaphysica

A little more about the meaning of Fundamental logic

Concerning N again

Basic mathematics given E

Properties and platonism

 

 

The Fundamental logical principles

 

 

  Addition III

All can take its beginning in Ia and Ib

A little more regarding properties

Without "empiri"

E without presumptions

A little more about consciousness

Morals

"Empirical" experiments

"N's" truth table again

Concerning the most fundamental (again)

 

 

 

 

Everything is about assumptions, nothing is (ex ante) determined/defined before it is determined/defined. Especially what is true is consequently an assumption. What basically, fundamentally, genuinely, de facto perhaps are valid, are true, are undecidable, but it is then (maybe) about an assumption, if x, something, a phenomenon, a proposition (a matter of fact), is true (or false):

 

x is true or false by assumption (if x de facto is true or false is undecidable).

 

If x is (assumed to be) true, then all y(=x’=non-x) are false (for "x", given Kp, see next section)

 

If x is assumed to be false, the question is if it exists some else x=y, which by assumption as a "replacer" for x makes x true? Which can be defined to define/implicate (";" is most simply read: given (that), or: under condition of):

 

x=false; x has (one or more) "replacers" (which makes x true; One "replacer" replaces x at a time given Kp):

 

x=y; y≠0(,x); 0=[no x(≠0)].

 

x=[completely false]; x(≠0 ex ante) has no "replacer" (≠0, which makes x true):

 

x=0 (ex post).

 

Given this, x is then true or false (completely false (x has no "replacers") or only false (x has one or more "replacers")) per assumption, not per se, de facto, such truth, falsity is thus undecidable, which the forthcoming more rigorously will show.

 

Parenthetically given this, it can be stated that so-called truth table analysis is worthless, because such excludes the possibility of x to be completely false (y≠0 is true if x is false, and vice versa, x≠0 is true if y is false, for all x (phenomena) there is an x≠0 which defines x true, which defines x≠0 being true, for all x there is something that defines x true (being true), something that ≠0 (the Negation (N), see especially further Addition), which of course excludes existence of completely false x, that x=0), which commonly simpliciter cannot be excluded, which defines (given Kp, and all posts are (of course) valid per definition/assumption (the foregoing in tabular form)):

 

                x≠0                          y                                  x=0                           y

                true                   all y false                         true                    all y false

completely false/false    0/y true         completely false/false     y(≠0) true

 

  

If x≠0 (ex ante) it then can be valid that y=0 (that x is completely false), by which it then simply not exists any true x (x=0, ex post), by which of course an analysis of x is meaningless (to analyse, especially prove, something completely false, which simpliciter not exists (other than (completely) false in the mind/thought), is (of course, completely) meaningless).

 

It is thus about assumptions, so what shall be assumed first? I really wrestled with that question, until I finally realized where to start, namely in an assumption of the Uniqueness principle (Up), which defines that "different" x with identical, exactly the same properties, are one and the same, unique, x.* Which may seem trivial, but Up has enormous significance for the World view, if Up is assumed, which as I see it, a rational simpliciter must do. Note well the "World view", not a World view (among many), but the only (unique, rational) World view, give and take a little.

 

Given Up the most further are about marginalities, (self) evident facts many times, actually (rationally seen (albeit maybe demanding some initial thought activity, but when it well is seen, then it actually is, many times, or at least appears to be, evident), which (of course) means in accordance with my way of thinking rationally, with which a reader of course has to decide whether she also finds what I find rationally, rationally), even if the theorem T1 also is extremely important for the World view (the Logic), but for a rational it is almost evident that p-superpositionalities are absurd, that x cannot exist superimposed on each other, especially not property-wise, an x cannot (rationally) both have and not have a property, at the same time (the property cannot be x(≠0) and 0, at the same time, as it can be defined), or, a property cannot be several (different), at one and the same time (x be x(≠0) and y(≠0,x), at one and the same time), for a rational that is as said almost evident. And T1 is precisely about such both having and not having x (it is (rationally) not possible to both have/eat and not have/eat the cake, at the same time), namely Nothing, which for a rational then almost naturally excludes itself, this with which the assumption of T1 per se not is especially controversial, for a rational. Although the implications of T1 may be controversial for rational ones, who at least claim to be rational.

 

With Up and T1 it has come a long way, very far, thus only through (the assumption of) two principles. The assumption of additional principles (besides a common assumption that people can draw (implicative) conclusions on the basis of these two principles, commonly defined in Ii) is commonly not necessary, and a meticulous task if it is seen necessary, since the assumption of something irrationally of course introduce irrationality into the analysis, however much the analysis gives correct results, it is wrong if it presupposes inaccuracies, although irrationalities of course can be used as "calculators" of results, but of course not as describing (modelling) reality:

 

If x ® y and z ® y, but z is false, x true (according to the world view, view of reality), but z perhaps is easier to use than x, then z can be used as a "calculator", but of course not be assumed to describe reality, since according to the world view it is then x which gives (implicates) y (not z).

 

To adopt principles in an analysis restricts it, the analysis gets "laws" to adhere to (even a law that states that everything is permitted restricts, because the thought then immediately wonders why that must be pointed out, the thought is no longer free, but begins to wonder what thinkable "laws" are overstepped if it must be stated that they freely can be overstepped). And to restrict the world view one must have a lot on one's feet. The unrestricted thinking per se defines rules, the thinking is just constructed that way, which commonly makes it unnecessary/pointless to point these rules out through "laws", principles (furthermore it is overpowering to point them all out, see the following). An example: Unrestricted, if x is assumed to be y, x=y, then x=y by assumption ‒ given/provided that what is assumed is what is assumed (x=x), which of course commonly restricts, but the alternative to assume that what is assumed is about something undecodable or decodable else (x≠x) is only unfruitful, is nothing that restricts the question, the problems around that which is specifically assumed (if it is assumed) ‒ and it is given that y=x not necessarily is valid, it not needs to be pointed out, because unrestricted it is evident. But if there is the (thus restricted) view (which there is, which will be returned to in the next section) that x=y (implicatively) identically is y=x, that symmetry generally (always) is valid, then (in the name of truth) it must (of course) be pointed out that this (rationally) is wrong. Or, is it for example assumed that x>y, then it is evident (implicatively identically) that y>x not is valid, that y=x not is valid, etcetera, and there is a question mark about whether x+y can be valid, patch of grass is valid, etcetera, it is simpliciter an overpowering task to set up, define all "laws" which (implicatively identically) follows from an assumption, which are in accordance with the assumption or are contradicting the assumption. But it is, simpliciter must be, the assumption, the assumptions, which is the primary, which is in focus, is what is definitively, categorically assumed, is valid (as long as it is assumed (to be valid)), then may the implications of those assumptions as far as possible (perhaps) be investigated, which under all circumstances means the exclusion of much, too overpowering to unravel in detail (but what it is about, sees, or at least a definer or a reader of a definer has a hunch of, depending on experience).

 

Simply put: If x is assumed, then implicitly simultaneously x’(=non-x(=y≠x)) are assumed which are in accordance with x, and x’ which not are in accordance with x. And then usually the primary in an analysis is to seek to make the implicit x’ which are in accordance with x explicit, to make the x’ which not are in accordance with x explicit is (usually) more secondary.

 

The work begins in the next section with a definition of the rational, Fundamental logical basis, the Rational basis, in short, which primarily means definition of the already mentioned Up and what Up implicates. An analysis which comes to address the question of how different x are (causally) connected to each other, what relations can (rationally) be thought to exist between different x. Commonly regarding this Ii (Implicative identity(/identities)) is assumed, that the mind, the thought perhaps can see something (implicatively identically) follow from/upon something else. For example if x is assumed, then the thought Ii-wise (commonly) see that y(≠x) cannot be valid for x ‒ for the phenomenon x (the basic (the intension)) defined by (the linguistic) x (the extension); There is no meaning in making a sign-distinction between these two "different" phenomena, because in intensional analysis they merge in any case; Purely extensional "analysis" of x, without giving x any (intensional) meaning, is only a superficial ("aesthetic" ) viewing, without any interpretation of x (only creating a feeling perhaps), with which it of course not is possible to learn anything deeper from it ‒ but y is false (for x) if x is (assumed) true (this more rigorously defined by Kp in the next section).

 

The Lp-section further defines a specific relational principle (conventionally usually assumed, for example in the form of: x=y ® x+z=y+z) to see what it leads to (derives), what it (analytically) implicates. An analysis which comes to the conclusion that Lp cannot be generally assumed, from which the general conclusion can be drawn that no principles beyond the principles of the Rational basis (rationally) can be taken for granted, can generally be assumed without further ado. But in that case they may be assumed after thorough analysis in the specific context in which they are thought to maybe be valid in.

 

The Lp-analysis, depending on the choice of analysed problems/questions in the Lp-section, in itself gives rise to questions regarding the World (E), which are more specifically analysed in the E-section, without using Lp or any other "higher order" principle, but only by using the principles of the Rational basis, especially T1, that Nothing not exists (at all).

 

This that only the principles of the Rational basis are used, with the addition of certain "empirical" observations, is extremely important, simpliciter because, in accordance with the Lp-section, it is not possible to generally rely on any other ("higher order") principles, they can generally used not be ruled out to lead completely wrong (even though they then may be rational in some specific context, but thus not generally (always (in all contexts))).

 

After the E-section short about what is valid if T1 not is valid, thus if Nothing exists, can exist, in which case especially Albert Einstein's (1879-1955) so-called theories of relativity (1905-1915) are a "possibility", which briefly are explained for the sake of enlightenment.

 

Last an Addition, primarily concerning so-called Classical logic, which commonly expressed assumes that there are generally valid principles in addition to those of the Rational basis. In particular Classical logic assumes a relational principle it calls the negation (N), which (causally) binds different x together, in a very categorical way. Fundamental logically the Negation simpliciter is false, which already  been hinted (by the dismissal of truth table analysis, which presupposes a table completely different from the rational above), but then more about Classical logic in the Addition (and in Addition II).

 

__________

* Especially Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) philosophized about this question of identity, thoughts today especially manifested in the mathematical Axiom of extensionality. And Up is in these thoughts, right in front of the nose, but is not realized (fully), but identically is assumed to maybe be different according to these thoughts, which Up excludes (strictly), why Up is specifically defined, Up is not identically the Axiom of extensionality (the Axiom of extensionality is implicatively identically Up, Up is so to speak a subset of the Axiom of extensionality).

 

Principles (of thought)

 

Total nothingness=propertieslessness not prevails, because if total nothingness prevails, for example this text cannot be read:

 

Properties (x’) exists, at least in this now, if for example this text can be read (experienced):

 

x={x’}; {x’} is a cluster of x’ (properties), which characterize, constitute, define x, then in that way that x (identically) is {x’}.

 

If "different" x "have" exactly, identically the same {x’}, then it (rationally) is the matter of the same, unique x:

 

Up) x=y=[unique x]; [{x’}Î x]=[{x’}Îy]:

 

Ip) x=x=[unique x]; [{x’}Îx]=[{x’}Îx].

 

Kp) x≠y; [{x’}Îx]≠[{x’}Îy].

 

Ip and Kp follows implicatively identically from Up, Up is implicatively identically Ip and Kp:

 

Up=Ip,Kp.

 

Implicative identity more commonly defined:

 

Ii) x=x’; x’Îx in intensional, meaning-wise meaning (as evident [x properties]=x’Îx).

 

Ii-phenomena/x are as identities superpositionalities, they exists at one and the same time, "time-wise", but not necessarily "room-wise", Ii-x needs so to speak not (be seen to) exist in the same place, position, "point", p (non-extension with position), by which Ii-x not are p-superpositionalities, which both "time-wise" and "room-wise" exists in the same "p", which are defined:

 

Sx=x(p)+y(p); x,y=[x(={x’}),x’].

 

Such strict p-superpositionalities, thus that x is several different x at one and the same time in (the same) "p", where x then can be an x(={x’}) or an x’, a property, are intuitively commonly absurd, but given forthcoming E-theory there is rationally a (big) exception, namely that stable mx momentarily (principally during time≤tp; tp=time-p) can exist superpositionally with other mx/mv, which E-theoretically are the only possible p-superpositionalities (which not verify the Nothing-superpositionality below, which is assumed to define/prove T1, because the E-theory presupposes T1).

 

Ii almost directly clarify that symmetry, that x=x’ and that x’=x (x’≠x, commonly also y≠x, but in the latter case it is commonly (per definition) not excluded that y=x may be valid, so when the analysis wants to be clear about that it is about non-x(≠x), then x’ is used), not is valid in general, but an example: (x « y)=(x ® y), and (x ® y)≠(x « y), unless x « y given(/presupposed) is valid: (x ® y)=(x « y); (x « y).*

 

Transitivity in the meaning x=y=z is valid in accordance with Ii, can be stated, transitivity however not is valid if x=y and z=y, thus x=z is in general not valid in that case, and that of course because symmetry not is valid in general, which also is entirely intuitive, because different x (commonly) very well implicatively identically may define (implicate) the same x. These basic principles present (which are in the convention), the concept of reflexivity also can be mentioned, which here (approximatively) is equivalent to Ip. 

 

What an x is implicatively identically to may require its reasoning, even in terms of properties, indeed, something, x’, which is seen to follow from x can also be defined to be a property of x: x has the property (to be able to implicate) x’ (x ® x’), so what are to be seen as properties of x requires (may require) its discussion, perhaps implying that some properties are seen as direct (more categorical), others as indirect (less categorical, more loose).

 

Ii-x are more categorical, "strong" x (phenomena) than ("weaker") implication-x, where the binding, relation between x and y thus not is as strong (x ® y, x gives y (or: if x, then y, or: x implicates y)). For the implication it is commonly valid that [((x))=[perhaps(/maybe(/possibly)) x (x perhaps(/maybe(/possibly)))]]:

 

Ia) ((x,z,å,..)) ® y; If several x gives y in the same moment ("tp") it happens in different locations; Up.

 

Several, maybe very many x can give, "produce" y, or maybe just one (unique) x in some exceptional case (if x not implicates (any) y, then it of course not is a matter of an implication, or if x anyway is defined to implicate (any) y, then it of course is false definition).

 

Ib) x ® ((y,z,å,..)); How many y x can give in the same moment ("tp") depends (naturally) on x constitution.

 

An x can give, "produce", different, maybe many different y, or in some exceptional case maybe just one (unique) y.

 

Ii-x can (rationally) weaker be defined as implication-x:

 

(x=y)=(x ® y).

 

The reverse however, is not valid:

 

(x ® y)≠(x=y).

 

If it not is given that x=y is valid:

 

(x ® y)=(x=y); x=y.

 

Kp (the Contradiction principle, which then Up (the Uniqueness principle) implicatively identically defines) is especially useful, because Kp defines that if x is (assumed to be) true, then all y(≠x), as "replacers" for (the phenomenon) x (defined by x), are false:

 

All y are false; x is true; Kp.

 

If x is assumed to be false, then it either is to completely reject x, declare x to be completely false:

 

x is completely false if x=0=[no x(≠0)] ex post; x≠0 ex ante.

 

A completely false x is implicatively identically to there being no "replacer" y≠0 to x, y=0:

 

x is (only) false if it at least exists one "replacer" y(≠0) to x (which (by assumption) makes x true, which is the second falsehood alternative (or-alternative)):

 

Only one (unique) y can replace x, at a time; Up.

 

x+y=[unique x](; Up), where x defines the phenomenon y (linguistically or non-linguistically/factually/"empirically"/empirically; "Empiri" is perception that are perceived to correspond to empiri, to something that exists per se, independent of "empiri" or other perception/experience/apprehension) defines (y so to speak is  in place for to perform/define).

 

Or: x*+y≠x*+y’, where x* defines the (basic) phenomenon that x false and y and y’ true defines.

 

Ip (the Identity principle) defines that x are the properties x has (owns), or are, with which the question can be asked if {x’} per se, as a function of itself, can change, become more x’ (holism) or less x’ (meridioism):

 

x={x’}±q?

 

If for example (meridioistically) x={x’}-q it not contradicts Ip (if {x’}-q={x’}-q), and can thus not be ruled out as a contradiction in accordance with Kp, but what is valid regarding this must consequently be analysed in another way:

 

If the "original" {x’} is unchanged, no x’ is exogenously added to {x’}, or subtracted, taken away from {x’}, or x’Î{x’} not separate anything off, divides itself, then q(=x’≠0) arises from Nothing respectively disappears into Nothing. More specifically, the following can be defined: x=nx’; n≤m, and x=nx’±q; n>m, thus at a limit one to x added x’ gives rise to ±q, q which thus must arise from Nothing (+q), or disappear, "dissolve" in to Nothing (-q). With which of course the question is if that is possible? If Nothing exists, then there principally is the possibility for that (just through the existence of Nothing), but not if Nothing not exists, because it is excessively irrationally, absurd to assume that something can arise from something that not exists, or to assume that something can turn into something which not exists at all. So the ruling is thus primarily about the existence of Nothing, can that existence be determined? Yes, if that p-superpositionality that Nothing=propertieslessness defines is assumed to be absurd, which is assumed, then the existence of Nothing can be excluded:

 

Nothing=[propertieslessness (propertiesless x)]:

 

The property propertieslessnessÎ[existing Nothing].

 

Because if the property propertieslessnessÎ[non-existing Nothing], then of course Nothing not exists (given Ip; (non-existing Nothing)=(non-existing Nothing)(; Ip)).

 

An existing Nothing which as propertiesless (having the property propertieslessness) not has any properties:

 

The property propertieslessnessÏ[existing Nothing]:

 

T1) Nothing not exists (at all):

 

Up’’) x={x’}:

 

x≠{x’}±q.

 

Holism/meridioism thus not exists, thus provided/given that Nothing defines an absurd p-superpositionality.*

 

Given Up’’ the following further directly (implicatively identically) can be stated:

 

FT) Undecidable/independent (non-axiomatic non-derivable, holistical) sentences x’=qÎ[theory x] not exists.

 

No x is (in accordance with Up’’) given as just only the sum of other sentences:

 

The cluster of (sentences) x’ in itself defines nothing, but it is the one who defines, interprets and argues for x’ that defines x’ and what implicatively identically follows (is seen to follow) from x’. So it is almost necessary to be over-clear in the definition of what is seen to follow (to be possible to derive) from x. If the "jump" (between x and x’) is too big, even the definer not sees the "connection" between x and x’, the ("continuous") logic that brings from x to x’, then it simpliciter not is a matter of (rational) logic; Rationally the whole "process" from x to x’ must be seen(/realized), and be motivated (be given clear reasons for), exceptions from that must thoroughly be motivated, for example when a (deriving)principle (of inference) is assumed, which moves the analysis forward, to results, but it not is (really) possible to see how it (the principle) "procedurally" does when it leads to (derives) conclusions.

 

Further given Up it is (implicatively identically) valid that:

 

Up’) ¦(x)=x.

 

That there not exists (functions of) superclones, different identical x, all x are then unique given Up, different only if they not have identically the same x’ (in accordance with Kp).

 

Are there some other principles than the foregoing which can be assumed generally? Which is analysed in the next section.