Addition II

  

Context Nothing

 

Mathematically there is the volume, plane/surface, curve, point (non-extension with position): p, and non-extension (without position): 0*.

 

An existing p has commonly a surrounding, or not. If not, then p is surrounded by Nothing(=propertieslessness), Nothing immediately takes on "after" p:

 

p)=Nothing, where p) defines a p directly "after" p; Nothing surrounds p.

 

If there exists a distance between p and p), then Nothing not exists (there) between p and p), since Nothing as propertiesless of course not is a distance (a curve), and consequently there is no distance between p and p) if p is surrounded by Nothing:

 

p=p); Nothing surrounds p.

 

So (also) p is consequently Nothing if Nothing exists surrounding p.

 

By analogy it can be stated:

 

0*=p); p)=Nothing is a p directly "after" 0*; Nothing surrounds 0*.

 

So even 0* is thus Nothing if Nothing exists surrounding 0*.

 

So if p or 0* de facto exists, then they are not surrounded by Nothing (if p or 0* de facto not exists, Nothing prevails, so to speak everywhere): 0* as positionless principally directly spans an infinite volume out, in all directions (0* exists, so to speak, everywhere and nowhere). p in principle does the same, since a p can be defined anywhere, and is then (as existing) not surrounded by Nothing, which of course also spans an infinite volume in all directions out (V; V which then further can be stated to be =E).

 

Is p or 0* de facto existing, and thus also V? Yes, because it is evident that Nothing not prevails (everywhere), this text for example cannot be read if Nothing prevails, and if this text is read, then a p can be defined to exist for example (somewhere) where the arrow points ® , a p which of course cannot be seen, since p is non-extended, but p can be assumed to exist there anyway. This however not rule out that Nothing can exist some time, although then not now, at the time of writing (in which then Nothing not prevails (everywhere)):

 

If Nothing exists, can exist, then it intuitively is absurd that x≠Nothing can arise from(/in) an existing Nothing, but it cannot be categorically ruled out, just because of the existence of Nothing, because it is not absurd that existence can lead to (imply) other existence. And it is also not absurd that x could turn into Nothing, if Nothing can exist, for the same reason as in the previous sentence. But the existence or non-existence of Nothing cannot be determined on the basis of the foregoing, but some other argumentation is consequently required for that:

 

Nothing (as propertiesless) not has the property that x can arise from Nothing, or the property that x can turn into Nothing. The latter can directly be ruled out as irrational, since Nothing (rationally) cannot determine anything about/for x. But commonly x may very well be able to turn into Nothing, given that Nothing can exist, if Nothing not exists on the other hand it is however excessively absurd to assume that x can turn into Nothing, and with that of course be, exist as, this non-existent Nothing (an absurd p-superpositionality). The former is more ingenious, but Nothing also not has the property that x cannot arise from Nothing, which semantically opens up the possibility that x can arise from Nothing. So commonly it is completely open whether x can arise from an existing Nothing, or not. If on the other hand Nothing not exists, it is however a given that x cannot arise from Nothing, because it is excessively absurd to assume that x can arise from something non-existent.

 

So this then not determined the question of the existence of Nothing, but it has to go back to the argumentation to/for T1 for determination of the existence of Nothing (just only an ad hoc assumption of the existence of Nothing, or not,* ruled out, such an assumption is (of course) unserious, irrational), T1 which then defines that Nothing not exists (at all).

 

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* "Not" includes (the assumption) not to take a position on the issue at all, which then of course also is unserious (sloppy nearest), which is obvious given the preceding, because the being or not being of Nothing rationally thus has enormous importance.

 

 

Think void instead of Nothing, and concerning mx

 

T1 which then further leads to the (ultimate) conclusion that 0 ® mx and that mx ® 0, void ({mv}) gives rise to mx (creation), and mx eventually turns into void (again, completion). So it is thus about void/volume, not Nothing. A rational should never (given T1) speak of Nothing, but think/speak void, emptiness (in the void, empty room). The sentence: There is nothing, must consequently rationally be interpreted as that void prevails, especially where something (x) perhaps could have been (the wanted wrench, for example). An empty space which "empirically" of course is filled with a lot of other things (a lot of scrap in a storage room for example), if the context now not is out in space, where this whit an empty space of course is more de facto relevant (if the wrench not is there, in the void; A void that usually not is so empty in the Universe, for example light is often in the (Universe's) void, but of course much else also can be there, which the naked eye cannot see, outmost then mx which then (as stable) moves, thrusts mv away; If you think about this for a bit, you soon realize that (especially) the Universe is totally black, or how it now should be expressed, that it is the brain that especially puts "light" on the Universe through its interpretation of then (outmost) incident mx, or interprets other incident mx as coldness and others perhaps as warmth: Light, warmth, coldness, etcetera are thus the brain's interpretation of various incident mx (in a chain which then results in the brain's interpretation). There may thus be a connection (correspondence) between incident mx and the brain's interpretation of this incidence, but it is quite obvious that large, if not huge discrepancy can prevail between the brain's interpretation and what actually is going on, then concerning the incident mx).

 

mx which then commonly either is created by E-contractions, or by {mx} thrusting or attracting (given an assumption of mx-attraction) voids (mv), or by voids ("virtual particles") locally attracting ("sucking up/in") mv: Is there any difference between attraction and "sucking up/in"? No, "suck in" (if it not is about attraction) is for mx identically to the absurd (too advanced) that mx have "grapnels" with which they can haul in ("suck in") each other, so "suck in" is consequently identically (to) attraction. And the E-section then excludes that E can "ignite" attraction in "virtual particles ("mx")", thus in local void (mv, E can only "ignite" E-contractions):

 

"Virtual particles" (possible mx) only exists in the meaning as defining a possible outcome of mx in space-contractions (not as "mv-suckers"=mv-attractors).

 

No, voids are voids, albeit containing, defining the possibility (property) of being able to become mx (given the existence of mx/x), and local finite voids cannot rationally create a thing so to speak on their own. Infinite void, thus E, has (in terms of properties) this infinity, then unlike finite voids, a principal difference which at least principally opens up the possibility for E-contractions, which then must (be able to) occur given the existence of mx/x given T2.

 

mx which further then in accordance with the "empiri" seems to have attraction force, be able to hold together more firmly, clusters of mx not only are like loose sand. An attraction force which given that mx, as the small things mx are, cannot send attraction particles (a) out, mx just only have (owns). And even if mx (absurdly) would be large advanced things, which can send a out, then a must be absurdly advanced in order to firstly be able to perform its task, to attract/pull other mx, and secondly to perhaps be able to find its way back to the (mother-)mx a is sent out from. Especially the latter requires incredibly absurd extremely advanced a, especially if mother-mx has moved, and furthermore of course the mother-mx is completed (quite) quickly if a not finds its way back to mother-mx, of course given that mother-mx not so to say is replenished, which leads into even more complicated discussions about mx if mx is assumed to be able to replenish (which they then cannot be once they become stable in accordance with the E-theory). No, the fundamental here is primarily that mx cannot send a out, as the small things mx are, and secondarily if mx nevertheless absurdly is assumed to be able to send a out, that a in order to perform its task, incredibly absurd must be incredibly advanced, especially if a also is assumed to be able to track back to its mother-mx. There are simpliciter no (rational) arguments whatsoever for the existence of a. But if mx have attraction force, then mx then just only have it (without sending a out, or anything else).

 

All (stable) mx are then rationally exactly the same (consisting of the same number of mv, the same "mass"), which provided that mx has attraction force excludes that mx can be repelling or neutral (neither attracting nor repelling), well, alternately it is conceivable, thus that mx can shift between being attracting, repellent and neutral, which (of course) again introduces that mx are absurdly advanced. No, if mx have attraction force, it is only attraction force mx have, and that constantly, if mx so to speak can turn on and off the attraction force, then mx again is defined to be absurdly advanced.

 

Rotation(/spin) is also a thinkable property for mx, but of course not that mx can make itself rotate, it again means that mx are absurdly advanced, that they have an inherent motor. No, if mx rotates, then it is because other mx attraction force (or thrusts) causes mx to rotate.

 

Summary:

 

All (stable) mx have the same mass (consists of the same n number of mv).

 

All mx have constant attraction force (which mx just only have(/owns) (no a is sent (shot) out (from mx))).

 

Other mx attraction forces (and thrusts) can perhaps cause mx to rotate (mx cannot rotate by its own force).

 

Further a question is what mx look like more specifically as consisting of compressed void, as a compressed number of mv? A more or less diffuse entity is closest at hand to (intuitively) assume. That mx can have some mathematical distinct form seems absurd. mv have no actual(/empirical) form as only existing principally, but is then rather a smallest "energy"-amount, which if they are thought superimposed (then n pieces) then defines a mx.

 

This which, as already is stated, strongly deviates from what is conventionally defined/assumed, where it then swarms of different kinds of mx. All "mx" (today then 61 pieces) except one, the Higgs boson, are furthermore so to speak empty shells, without mass, unless the Higgs boson is in the context, intuitively (in accordance with the E-theory) they are then nothing but empty space, nothing but "virtual mx". This just only strange (mysticism),* because mx cannot rationally decide anything for other mx per se (as then the Higgs boson is assumed to be able to), mx can only perhaps exogenously affect other mx, never endogenously (per se, mx can never affect other mx "intrinsically", but only perhaps attract or thrust other mx, and perhaps then cause mx to rotate).

 

All properties other than the previous (E-theoretically defined) which mx conventionally is assumed to have (own/possess) are rationally pure imagination, the only one of these (many) properties that have any rational intuition is charge, which can be assumed to be synonymous with attraction force, rather "negative", since "positive" semantically is something expanding (repelling). With which it then (by definition) can be spoken about attraction force as a negative charge. But more than that concerning "charge" cannot rationally be defined, thus any charge other than "negative", especially then "positive", not exists, rationally (other than then perhaps as irrational thoughts).

 

The World (E) can with this be argued not to be especially strange (rationally), even if the (mx-)attraction force and that that thrusted mx reasonably "jumps" in thrusting mx "jump"-directions are strange, if it now exists (in E, other than then as thought), but otherwise it may well be argued that E is intuitive (even that that E can start E-contractions from/in "still" space is intuitive, because there rationally is no alternative). This (of course) in sharp contrast to how it usually sounds, which can be summed up in: The more you know, the less you understand. But given the E-theory it is simpliciter the mind, especially that of man, that messes it up, especially when it interprets x={mx} which it perceives to exist per se beyond the mind. For the mind can of course define, see much more than what are rationally (E-theoretically) valid, especially those who affirm the irrational (including x which is a mix (assimilation) of rational and irrational x), those who only seek to ensure the rational consciously limits their mind, what they allow their mind to think:

 

The mind>E.

 

Given this especially rational ones can have a very hard time understanding irrational ones, especially socially, because rational ones (with their rational thinking) impossibly can understand irrational thinking, behaviour, it is just only nonsense to a rational. Irrational ones can certainly have as much difficulty understanding rational ones, but commonly they in any case have a greater possibility to understand rational ones, because rationality means being able to provide a basis for one's (rational) thinking, for example then Up, a principle which most irrational ones should be able to understand, even if they don't want to assume it.

 

Irrationals are characterized by that they have no problems whit assuming x ad hoc, rationals have extreme difficulty with that, even if they sometimes must, when they impossibly can see any sensible/rational explanation for certain behaviour/thinking. But rationals wants as far as possible to "see" the basis of everything it assumes, which in this text then culminate in the E-theory, as basic explanation for Everything; The rational sees it as irrational to think that something can exist beyond E (especially as E is infinite, which irrationals commonly of course have no problems with), but Everything then exists within E's framework, for a rational, E which then especially excludes holism, important to point out, but x={mx} are thus nothing more than that (Up’’), something x/E transcending (mysticism) not exists.

 

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* Which gets even more strange considered that "mx" is assumed to be points, to its form. The Higgs boson thus adds mass to a point (other than the one in which the Higgs boson resides), which of course means that this point is something more than only a point. Even mv are assumed (E-theoretically) to be something more than only empty space, especially assumed to include the property of being able to become mx, but to assume that a (single) p can be something more than a (single) p is just only too much, especially considering that p (mathematically) in accordance with t2 must be infinitely many in a p to be more compact than a single p.^

 

^ Defining the constituents of the space to be p, defines the mathematical space. Which can be seen as an approximation of the E-space, as shell, basic structure, in which then primarily points, curves, surfaces and volumes can be defined, as shells, as so to speak non-compact (mathematical, geometrical, purely abstract) forms or figures. The E-theory adds compactness, which mx then defines as (by definition) being more compact than mv. mx compactness and form is principally what it is in E-space, can more specifically only be "empirically" determined (of course given a belief in "empirical" experience); mx form cannot be mathematically determined, but then only perhaps be "empirically" determined, and this simpliciter because the mathematical space not is identical to the E-space, even if mx (actual, but of course unknown) form principally can be mathematically depicted given the p-concept (which is sufficiently fine for that).

 

Well, the compactness is then defined in the E-space by mx (then defined to be n compressed mv (mv which then is the smallest (pure) volume in the E-space, which then not have to be identical to the smallest volume in the mathematical space, which then is a tetrahedron)). In the mathematical space, given the existence of p in it, compactness must be defined by compact p, more compact than a single p, which means existence of (superpositionally) superimposed p's, which then according to t2 is absurd, which (of course) means that the mathematical space (rationally) only is this non-compact structure that was talked about above, only is a "field" which at each point consists of only one (non-compact) p (not consists of superimposed p's ({p}Ïp), but then only consists of one unique p (pÎp)). The p-concept must consequently be rejected if equivalently the E-space is to be "mathematically" defined. p which consequently not exists de facto in the E-space (which already has been stated/established), but of course they still may be used purely abstract in some E-theoretical context where they (analytically) fit.

 

 

Concerning FT

 

Fundamental logically everything is about definition, about thinking only, nothing is determined before it is determined, with which "continuous logic" is the only rational, that every step, sequence in the logic is intuitive, "seen", realized, because if not, there is something that not is determined by reason, but something that principally is taken for granted, something principally platonistic, although it need not be de facto platonistic (exist per se), which it given the Fundamental logic of course not is, but to (by reason(/sense)) not see why something is as it is, but only taking it for granted, is principally the same as that platonism rules for this something.

 

De facto platonism defines theories X to exist per se regardless of whether X is consciously or not, X exists empirically, can actually be said, even if X obviously not exists like for example an empirical tree (if such now exists), but principally platonistical X anyhow exists in exactly the same way as empirical trees (completely independent of (a) consciousness).

 

As already mentioned, it is more intuitive that platonistical X, just because of their equivalently empirical existence, can contain undecidable/independent x than that only imagined/defined X can (do that). But if Up’’ also is assumed to be valid for (for the sake of the analysis assumed existing) platonistical X, then FT also is valid for platonistical X. And FT rationally also is valid for platonistical X, precisely as Up’’ rationally is valid for empirical x. So platonists (or for that matter non-platonists) who want to defend Gödel's incompleteness theorems have to explain why they not considers Up’’ to be true, or rather T1, because even platonists may find it excessively absurd to assume that something can arise from(/in) or pass (over) into something which not exists at all. And even if T1 not is assumed, but then the existence of Nothing is a possibility, then undecidable/independent x arises from Nothing, which even if Nothing exists actually is absurd (albeit not categorically absurd, as it is if Nothing not exists). Yes, defending the existence of undecidable/independent x is a delicate task, which platonists simpliciter cannot tackle. The attempts that exists can be compared to the explanation of interaction in Physics, they can be claimed to get confused in the swarm of particles/sentences and see something (holistically) more be able to arise in this swarm per se, as a function of this swarm. Completely wrong, if this is broken down it lands (fundamentally) in that it is about emergence from (out of) Nothing (of attraction in interaction (excluded that it is a matter of a mere (pure) mx-attraction force, as then in the E-theory, and that mx can send a (attraction particles) out, which can pull/drag mx which they come to; Physics specifically excludes the former, is a little into the latter, but speaks vaguely of just interaction, of some mysterious interaction (of force) between particles, it not speaks of "hooks", which it explicitly must be about, unless it is about pure attraction force, with which the whole ends up in holism) and of existence of undecidable/independent x in the platonism).

 

That Gödel formally proves the existence of undecidable/independent x depends on N, and is with that of no importance, because that formalism (that builds on N), Classical logic, thus simpliciter is wrong/irrational. Because already (the assumption of) N (the Negation) principally defines this with undecidable/independent x, defines the existence of x which (platonistically) unprovable exists per se (equivalently empirically), N just only (platonistically) is valid (thus either (the unique) x or the (the unique) y, then per assumption of N, it is thus the matter of platonism per assumption), precisely what also is valid (is assumed to be valid, or then Classically logically is proven to be valid, of course provided N) for undecidable/independent x; Given N, N is valid for every z within X domain, if z so are provable within/by X or not, x or y is true for z, then given N. For example it is (then) valid that it is unprovable if mx have attraction force in the E-theory (the "empiri" is then in the E-theory taken to help answering this question), a question (z) which of course is within the E-theory’s domain/area of definition, a question which if N would have been valid in the E-theory of course (platonistically) would have had an answer, namely then either x or y, where x and y of course nearest define the two alternatives that mx either has attraction force or not (a not-case which then negated in accordance with Dl defines (brings back to) that mx possesses attraction force, which simpliciter is absurd (how can something so common as this not-case bring back to something that specific, or what does this not-case more specifically define?), clearly shows how absurd Classical logic is). Fundamental logically it is then about definition, plain and simple (only), if especially then mx has attraction force, or not, if one of these alternatives (empirically, genuinely, de facto) is true, and the other false, is irrelevant, yes, nothing that at all can be determined, but then only can be ASSUMED, defined something about (in accordance with the thinking, the experience, especially then a rationally thinking, which then (especially) this work seeks to give an idea of (what it is)), and in this then perhaps the "empiri" ((the) thinking which is assumed to refer, correspond to empiri) can give a hint:*

 

Counter-proof is in accordance with Kp to show that an x contradicts some for true held x in the theory in question.** If x unusually cannot be counter-proved, then x must be provable/derivable in the theory in question, if x now not wants to be assumed as an axiom (especially then perhaps on the basis of "empiri", as then what is valid for the (mx-)attraction force), in accordance with FT; If (non-axiomatic) x is assumed to belong to a theory without being able to be counter-proved or proved, then it is simpliciter the matter of irrational undecidable/independent x in accordance with FT.

 

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* For Gödel's Incompleteness theorems no difference is of course valid, can be noted, they are about, are assumptions, especially is assumed around the truthfulness of the axioms, and quite especially is assumed around the truthfulness of the derivations (“true” axioms/rules of inference not necessarily derives true (conclusions), but that (assumed) true axioms derives true is an axiom especially in Classical logic, and with that of course something (intuitively/unintuitively) assumed, defined true.

 

** That is thus sufficient for contradictoriness, need not necessarily be the question of an (absurd) p-superpositionality, which in accordance with N is a conventionally common view, that both x and y(=non-x) in N, "contradictorily", cannot be valid at the same time, the "Law of (non-)contradiction" ((x Ù y)’; N). The Fundamental logic thus defines much more commonly, "loosely", or rather actually very much more strictly. It is enough with the smallest deviation from something assumed true (x), then this deviation is false (x(=y)≠x is false (for x)).

 

Principia Mathematica

 

Principia Mathematica, at the pages 94-97, reproduced on the website Law of thought, defines these six "primitive propositions" of importance (which here are defined with = instead of ® (É), which changes nothing, because the intension of ®, just like with =, is that the left side can be exchanged for the right side, well, rather it is better with =, because ® loses the (weaker) meaning (≠[=]) to be able to implicate without it being the matter of implicative identity if [®]=[=]):

 

2) (x Ú x)=x(; x=(x Ú x)).

 

3) y=(x Ú y).

 

4) (x Ú y)=(y Ú x).

 

5) (x Ú (y Ú z)=(y Ú (x Ú z).

 

6) (y ® z)=((x Ú y) ® (x Ú z)).

 

7) If x is an elementary proposition, x’=y is an elementary proposition (=N).

 

These principles are by Principia Mathematica assumed to be true without proof, commonly none of them are evident true, except for 2, apart from the parenthesis sentence, which actually (the parenthesis) Classically logically is the most important part of this axiom, 2 which really is an axiom apart from the other sentences apart from 7. 3-5 are certainly not evident. 6 is valid provided that x not implicates z, which x of course commonly can, in which case the formula reads: (y ® z)=((x Ú y) ® z); x ® z, and with which of course 6 is false. 3-6 are however true given 7 and 2 (2 which is in accordance with the more common Tp). 7 which defines N, although 7 only defines that x=y, that y=x is valid is implicitly assumed, simpliciter because Principia Mathematica (Classical logic) assumes Dl (the Law of double negation) to be valid, which thus presupposes an assumption of N (without (assumption of) N Dl not exists (not is valid)): 

 

3:

 

y=(y Ú y):

 

y=(x Ú y); N.

 

4:

 

(x Ú x)=(x Ú x); 2 and that x=x, which then is valid given N, which more specifically then defines that N=(x « y),(x ® y),(y ® x),x,y=N(; N):

 

(x Ú y)=(y Ú x); N.

 

5:

 

Given 4:

 

(x Ú y)=(y Ú x):

 

(x Ú (y Ú y))=(y Ú (x Ú x)); 2:

 

(x Ú (y Ú y))=(y Ú (x Ú y)); N:

 

(x Ú (y Ú z))=(y Ú (x Ú z)); z=y; z=x,y; N.

 

6:

 

(y ® y)=((y Ú y) ® (y Ú y)); 2:

 

(y ® y)=((x Ú y) ® (x Ú y)); N:

 

(y ® z)=((x Ú y) ® (x Ú z)); z=y.

 

It is thus 7, or then N, which is the primary principle, and then then 2 (or more commonly Tp), 3-6 are theorems which follows from these two principles. This which consequently Principia Mathematica did not see, evident so, otherwise of course 3-6 would not have been set up as axioms ("primitive propositions", but then have been proved). And no one else has seen either, until this work, amazing to say the least. To further exemplify how N-logicians (Classical logicians) fundamentally view their N-logic, a look can be taken at the following contemporary (at the time of writing ongoing) work:

 

 

Principia Logico-Metaphysica

 

Which defines the following three "axioms" in chapter 8:

 

1) x=(y ® x).

 

Which of course directly follows from N (N=(y ® x),x=N; N).

 

2) (x ® (y ® z))=((x ® y) ® (x ® z)).

 

Already proven, but to take it again:

 

(x ® y)=(x ® y); N:

 

(x ® (y ® y))=((x ® y) ® (x ® y)); Tp: