With this it is into mathematics (again), which it especially given the E-theory is easy to slip into, because it is evident that the E-theory defines a fundament for development of mathematics, especially geometry, and the E-theory also defines (uses) certain basic mathematical concepts. But not much, because this work primarily (of course) not is mathematics (then it simpliciter not would be able to define what it does). More developed mathematics is so to speak a later issue, a problematic issue, which already has been discussed, especially Lp's unreliability shows. Lp which indiscriminately is used in mathematics. For example for proving the equivalent to Dl in mathematics, roughly as follows, given this work:

 

A) x-x=0:

 

I) -(x-x)=-0; Lp, [-]=[-1]:

 

-x--x=0; -(x-x)=-x--x (distributive principle), -0=0, which is valid given that 0 is idempotent:

 

--x-x=0; -x--x=--x-x (commutative principle):

 

II) --x=x; A(, Up).

 

Because it is the matter of manipulation of two superclones (of course contradicting Up’, but without the assumption of superclones there is no mathematics; Mathematics specifically assumes the existence of superclones through the assumption of the Axiom of extensionality), where then x superclonically is excluded from itself, the assumption of distributivity and commutativity is (intuitively) no problem (because (especially as) it is about summation (of (purely abstract) superclones) to 0), it is however in no way intuitive that exclusion of x-x (-(x-x)) is the same as x-x,* which it then given Lp is (for A to be identically (to) I). Neither is the result, II, intuitive, intuitively exclusion (--x) of an exclusion (-x) simply is a (tautological, pleonastic) double rejection (throwing away) of the exclusion, but primarily then given Lp, it brings back to x, just as if N had been assumed (x=-x).** N which definitely not is assumed to be generally valid in (pure) mathematics, in which it not is one if x is plus or minus (in applied mathematics it can be one, for example for length differences):

 

II can also be proved without Lp (and other complexities), because in accordance with A (A:s intension) it also is valid that:

 

A’) -x+x=0.

 

So if x=-x, it in-substituted in A gives:

 

-x--x=0:

 

--x=(+)x; A’.

 

But in any case is Lp mathematically extremely important, so not mathematically wrong to prove II whit the help of Lp, and in a way lucky that Lp given this later proof of --x=x leads to just that, not leads to, proves something else.

 

Well, Lp leads, as already been touched upon, to strange conclusions (although Lp in its specific formulation in this case of course brings in negation, which of course N also is about), albeit of course, concerning II, a practical conclusion, whose practical validity simply has to be tested, and in that II has turned out to satisfaction, obviously, otherwise II (of course) would not (mathematically) be used. And given the latter proof, given A’, it (rationally) simply must be valid, completely independent of Lp.

 

 

All in all, perhaps the most important this work teaches is that no x is given (determined before it is determined), but it is all about assumptions, definitions, interpretation of reality which results in assumptions, primarily in first x, basic x, "axioms" (".." because rationally truly fundamental "axioms" are almost given, given true, especially then Up, but can they, especially then Up, be disproved, then of course they not are given, but disproving especially Up is (rationally) completely impossible, because every proof, whichever, must presuppose Up (or equivalently) simpliciter for the proof to be the proof (x=x; x=[the proof]), not being something else (x≠x)), and secondarily especially important is about Ii-interpretations/derivations based on these basic x, or perhaps concerns derivations given/provided some assumed principle of derivation (rule of inference, such as then for example Lp), theorems:

 

basic-x ® theorem.

 

Another "empirical" possibility is that basic-x sees, interprets as the (causal) basis for something "empirically" out-interpreted:

 

e) basic-x ® hypothesis.

 

If an Ii-interpretation ("continuous logic") is difficult to find out in this, it has to be content with that, especially (pragmatically) if it is a practical implication. But naturally, the best is to try to find an Ii-interpretation, even if it not always is possible, take for example that that thrusted mx "empirically" seems to move reasonably in the thrusting mx "jump"-direction, which it then is no Ii-interpretation in/for.***

 

Only e may rationally be left unexplained, if it is about purely abstract theory, it can rationally not be left unexplained, in accordance with FT.

 

__________

* -(x-x)=x-x (implicatively identically, just like -(x-x)=) for example, but this then with no deeper meaning than that the right term is in the left term), but x-x is not given =-(x-x) (exactly as x=x’ not is given, but then x’=x (because x is in the left term)).

 

** Given that x’=-x, which without further ado can be stated to be what Classical logicians means that N defines, and it also is intuitive in one case, namely if it is defined that x’=E-x, thus that x’ is All exclusive (except) x, in which case excluding x (-x) intuitively defines x’: -x=x’=E-x, which defines that E=0’’; x±0’’=x, where 0’’ intuitively closest is 0*: 0’’=0*, which can be proved if Lp is assumed (which is done in section E), but Lp is then unreliable, so it has to suffice whit this intuition, which defines 0* to be a duality, both the largest (E, which 0* then can be interpreted as, as positionless) and the smallest (0’’, which it is evident that 0* is, interpreted as non-extension, only), which adds nothing to x, which argues for 0 to be defined to be (idempotent) void (empty space) ≠E, for the sake of distinction.

 

*** Given that mx "jumps" (with which it rationally then is that thrusted mx "jumps" unconditionally stochastic), which then is the rational/logical (continuous movement (p-long movements) is irrational/illogical). However, if continuous movement is (irrationally) assumed anyway, then it is rationally (intuitively) that thrusted mx’ moves depending on how thrusting mx moves into mx’, collides with mx’. So in some sense the alternatives must be weighed against each other, even if the basic problem of continuous/discontinuous movement is more fundamental than how the phenomenon of collision between mx looks like, is defined. And as for that, it only is valid that discontinuous movement is rational/logical, continuous movement not. "The empiri" will probably never give a hint here, because it has to go down to the utmost micro level for this to be "seen":

 

Given the E-theory it is regarding "empirical" knowledge, when it really concerns empirical (objective) knowledge, (outmost) incident mx which hit receptors which send signals (even that outmost mx of course) to the brain (in humans, which of course also outmost are mx (including the brain)). The brain interprets these signals, and can never know, firstly whether it really is a matter of (objectively) incident mx, because it might just as well be the brain per se that invents an impression, a thought, and secondly the brain can never, if it is the matter of incident mx (which then per se never can be known), know if these incident mx, given the process of the brain and the process between receptors and brain, correctly depicts, corresponds to empirical objects. It can only be ASSUMED that that is the case, the "empiri" only gives a hint of what empirically is valid. De facto it is the brain that determines what is "empirical"/empirical valid, simpliciter because the brain in accordance with the foregoing never can be sure if it really is about empirical knowledge.

 

Given this the only rational is to perhaps believe in clear "empirical" information, which mostly is about information that seems to come directly from the empiri, not mediated through/by instruments. E-theoretically it especially important is about the assumption that x attracts each other, hold together, "empirically" it appears to be so, despite it rationally is absurd, outmost then that mx (just only) can attract each other (that an invisible hand can bring mx towards each other). The brain is faced with a dilemma here, which should it believe, the rational or the irrational/absurd (some other options not exists, given an assumption of mx)? Also the assumption that thrusted mx "jumps" reasonably in thrusting mx "jump"-directions is then an "empirical" assumption, because thrusted mx then rationally "jumps" unconditionally stochastic. But "empirically" thrusted x moves more determinate (for example a billiard ball), unequivocally so, to deny that requires that the brain's "empirical" perception completely be rejected, declared strictly false, which well is to take it too far.

 

Direct "empirical" information is thus highly problematic, and even more problematic it becomes when instruments (devices) are involved, when an instrument (according to "empirical" perception), a "machine", mediates (is assumed to mediate) "empirical" information. For it is evident that the machine especially can deliver information just only created in the machine, any empirical input in/to the machine (which of course also is about (incident) mx (with an angle of incidence)) is so to speak lost (or non-existing), the machine simply ignores it perhaps, the machine just only delivers the information it (by the engineers) is programmed/created to deliver. But even if the machine actually processes input, incident mx, then of course the question is whether this process can be trusted, that the machine not distort the information incident mx perhaps provides (about the empiri).

 

But most important in any case is the interpretation of direct (by the (human) brain interpreted as being direct) as well of indirect (by machines/instruments mediated, which then the (human) brain interprets to be) "empirical" information, all such information can almost always, if not always, be differently interpreted, especially if it is about subtle experiments, where perhaps numbers, plots and graphs which a machine prints out must be interpreted. In the foregoing especially two interpretations of experiments have been made which differ from conventional interpretation, the first:

 

Einstein assumes that light not is captured/glued by attraction(/gravitation), which then gives rise to the theories of relativity, given that measuring instruments firmly anchored on (to) the Earth's surface not can measure relative speed of light of incident light that the instrument measures the speed of, which they also cannot according to actual experiments. E-theoretically light is captured/glued by (mx-)attraction, with which such firmly anchored measuring instruments simpliciter cannot measure relative light speed of incident light, for that the measuring instrument must be set in motion.

 

The second:

 

Quantum physicists assumes that small particles can interfere with themselves (why that would cause particles to take different paths?), to explain particle scattering, that small particles not moves linearly (especially in the "Double-slit experiment"). E-theoretically it simpliciter is so that small particles (consisting of fewer mx) moves wobbly, non-linearly. For more linear movement the "particles" must be larger (consist of more mx), and this is exactly what especially the Double-slit experiment shows, directly interpreted, without the introduction of "interference"; This concept of interference, including the concept of waves, probably was adopted given a continued assumption of the classical assumption that particles moves linearly, instead of simpliciter assuming that (small) particles moves non-linearly, they entangled (complicated) it with this with interference and particles being waves. Distinction must be made between attraction-movement and thrust-movement, thrust-movement as it is about in the Double-slit experiment, the particles are shot(/thrusted/pushed) through slits against a plate behind the slits. Attraction-movement on the other hand gives almost evident rise to more linear movement, towards the attracting mx. Of course depending on how the attracting mx moves, if they moves, then of course (rationally) the attracted mx bends their paths in the direction the attracting mx moves.^

 

^ This is a good example of that phenomena rationally almost gives themselves, of course it is possible to assume otherwise, but it is clearly irrational, at least in my mind, and I am convinced that most people see it that way, thus (with ones "inner eye") sees that by mx’ attracted mx cannot move in any direction other than the direction of attraction (towards mx’).^^ This rationally intuitive is so to speak everywhere in the E-theory, there is so to speak a rational (given) path to walk, at least concerning the most basic. Take for example further E, given T1, there is, given T1, as well as no alternative to the assumption of space-contractions (eternal mx excluded (T2 assumed)), the conventional that points, positions ("virtual particles") in E can "suck up" space, the (rational) intuition directly says no to, it simply expressed makes positions being something categorically more than pure space, or then a point (p) if it is about that. Even the most irrational probably hesitate to assume that a p can be a "space sucker" (which of course not hindered the physicists from nevertheless assuming roughly equivalently that, but that can be blamed on a confused, far too complicated definition, so that they lost their way, not sees clearly). Well, this then examples of rationally thinking, which then more or less given, leads to conclusions (on the "path").

 

^^ "Empirically" it is only possible to make indirect assumptions about mx, if any mx, because the human brain "empirically" has no access to the outmost (mx-)micro-level. The human brain "empirically" only sees "big splotches" as objects (when it interprets incident mx in the chain that perhaps were started by incident mx in to an eye), even when it comes to what it thinks it sees in instruments, it is far from perhaps "seeing" mx. And consequently it is a matter of from the "splotches" interpreting what perhaps is valid for mx, if any mx. With which man never can be sure that what she (indirectly) assumes for mx by observing the "splotches" is valid. For certainty direct access to mx is required. And even if it seemingly is present, it is in accordance with the foregoing then in any case only a matter of the brain's perception of the "empiri"/the empiri. But the "hint" can in any case be assumed to be more relevant if it is about "mx-level" than about "splotch-level".

 

An "mx-level" which then not is present, and probably never will be present, because given/provided that it is about mx, mx must be examined, "dissected" with other mx, other materially is too big, rough to be able to examine mx with. That mx literally can be seen is out of the question, the only thing that in that case can be seen is from mx reflected, bounced off mx, small "points", in order for an image to be created many "points" are required, which an mx simpliciter not can give rise to as being a "point", which then perhaps other incident mx after a collision can bounce away from, and of course only give the "image" of a "point", if these bouncing away mx can be "captured". Seeking to destroy mx, by bombarding it with (other) mx, in which case then mx (E-theoretically) is completed, requires that mx somehow can be "seen" to disappear/complete, just because mx completes, thus just only disappears, turns into being mv (again), there is nothing (no "energy")^^^ to measure (out), but this disappearance must then somehow be literally "seen". Regarding any attraction force (or other force), it is about "seeing" mx attracting other mx (or not), thus that mx in the vicinity of each other move towards each other, without any other (exogenous) force being involved, it only (perhaps) is about attraction. In groups/clusters of mx (especially then in slightly larger particles) thrusts also are involved, which are impossible to isolate, but for a categorical statement of attraction force of mx, an ("empirical") proof of it should consist of only two mx. And perhaps individual mx attraction force is too weak, so that only two mx not moves towards each other, with which of course no conclusion can be drawn, well, the direct conclusion would of course be that mx are neutral, a wrong conclusion of course if it is so that mx has attraction force, but that it takes mx in a group for it to have an impact. This as said only hypothetically, that mx-level can be reached is as said almost out of the question.

 

^^^ Yes, the mx-"energy" from completed mx flows so to speak out into the room, becomes one with it (mx diffuses (out into the room) so to speak (and with that then becomes one with the room)), with which the "energy" from the completed mx then principally are the (pure) volume mx has passed into being, with which the whole becomes extremely difficult to measure in any way, without going further into that. Physically measurable can without further ado (outmost) be claimed to be about (non-completed) mx, the "energy" are mx, a {mx}, not a {mv} as "energy" actually is (the "energy" that then can create mx, and mx then again transitions into when they completes).

 

Addition II

  

Context Nothing

 

Mathematically there is the volume, plane/surface, curve, point (non-extension with position): p, and non-extension (without position): 0*.

 

An existing p has commonly a surrounding, or not. If not, then p is surrounded by Nothing(=propertieslessness), Nothing immediately takes on "after" p:

 

p)=Nothing, where p) defines a p directly "after" p; Nothing surrounds p.

 

If there exists a distance between p and p), then Nothing not exists (there) between p and p), since Nothing as propertiesless of course not is a distance (a curve), and consequently there is no distance between p and p) if p is surrounded by Nothing:

 

p=p); Nothing surrounds p.

 

So (also) p is consequently Nothing if Nothing exists surrounding p.

 

By analogy it can be stated:

 

0*=p); p)=Nothing is a p directly "after" 0*; Nothing surrounds 0*.

 

So even 0* is thus Nothing if Nothing exists surrounding 0*.

 

So if p or 0* de facto exists, then they are not surrounded by Nothing (if p or 0* de facto not exists, Nothing prevails, so to speak everywhere): 0* as positionless principally directly spans an infinite volume out, in all directions (0* exists, so to speak, everywhere and nowhere). p in principle does the same, since a p can be defined anywhere, and is then (as existing) not surrounded by Nothing, which of course also spans an infinite volume in all directions out (V; V which then further can be stated to be =E).

 

Is p or 0* de facto existing, and thus also V? Yes, because it is evident that Nothing not prevails (everywhere), this text for example cannot be read if Nothing prevails, and if this text is read, then a p can be defined to exist for example (somewhere) where the arrow points ® , a p which of course cannot be seen, since p is non-extended, but p can be assumed to exist there anyway. This however not rule out that Nothing can exist some time, although then not now, at the time of writing (in which then Nothing not prevails (everywhere)):

 

If Nothing exists, can exist, then it intuitively is absurd that x≠Nothing can arise from(/in) an existing Nothing, but it cannot be categorically ruled out, just because of the existence of Nothing, because it is not absurd that existence can lead to (imply) other existence. And it is also not absurd that x could turn into Nothing, if Nothing can exist, for the same reason as in the previous sentence. But the existence or non-existence of Nothing cannot be determined on the basis of the foregoing, but some other argumentation is consequently required for that:

 

Nothing (as propertiesless) not has the property that x can arise from Nothing, or the property that x can turn into Nothing. The latter can directly be ruled out as irrational, since Nothing (rationally) cannot determine anything about/for x. But commonly x may very well be able to turn into Nothing, given that Nothing can exist, if Nothing not exists on the other hand it is however excessively absurd to assume that x can turn into Nothing, and with that of course be, exist as, this non-existent Nothing (an absurd p-superpositionality). The former is more ingenious, but Nothing also not has the property that x cannot arise from Nothing, which semantically opens up the possibility that x can arise from Nothing. So commonly it is completely open whether x can arise from an existing Nothing, or not. If on the other hand Nothing not exists, it is however a given that x cannot arise from Nothing, because it is excessively absurd to assume that x can arise from something non-existent.

 

So this then not determined the question of the existence of Nothing, but it has to go back to the argumentation to/for T1 for determination of the existence of Nothing (just only an ad hoc assumption of the existence of Nothing, or not,* ruled out, such an assumption is (of course) unserious, irrational), T1 which then defines that Nothing not exists (at all).

 

__________

* "Not" includes (the assumption) not to take a position on the issue at all, which then of course also is unserious (sloppy nearest), which is obvious given the preceding, because the being or not being of Nothing rationally thus has enormous importance.

 

 

Think void instead of Nothing, and concerning mx

 

T1 which then further leads to the (ultimate) conclusion that 0 ® mx and that mx ® 0, void ({mv}) gives rise to mx (creation), and mx eventually turns into void (again, completion). So it is thus about void/volume, not Nothing. A rational should never (given T1) speak of Nothing, but think/speak void, emptiness (in the void, empty room). The sentence: There is nothing, must consequently rationally be interpreted as that void prevails, especially where something (x) perhaps could have been (the wanted wrench, for example). An empty space which "empirically" of course is filled with a lot of other things (a lot of scrap in a storage room for example), if the context now not is out in space, where this whit an empty space of course is more de facto relevant (if the wrench not is there, in the void; A void that usually not is so empty in the Universe, for example light is often in the (Universe's) void, but of course much else also can be there, which the naked eye cannot see, outmost then mx which then (as stable) moves, thrusts mv away; If you think about this for a bit, you soon realize that (especially) the Universe is totally black, or how it now should be expressed, that it is the brain that especially puts "light" on the Universe through its interpretation of then (outmost) incident mx, or interprets other incident mx as coldness and others perhaps as warmth: Light, warmth, coldness, etcetera are thus the brain's interpretation of various incident mx (in a chain which then results in the brain's interpretation). There may thus be a connection (correspondence) between incident mx and the brain's interpretation of this incidence, but it is quite obvious that large, if not huge discrepancy can prevail between the brain's interpretation and what actually is going on, then concerning the incident mx).

 

mx which then commonly either is created by E-contractions, or by {mx} thrusting or attracting (given an assumption of mx-attraction) voids (mv), or by voids ("virtual particles") locally attracting ("sucking up/in") mv: Is there any difference between attraction and "sucking up/in"? No, "suck in" (if it not is about attraction) is for mx identically to the absurd (too advanced) that mx have "grapnels" with which they can haul in ("suck in") each other, so "suck in" is consequently identically (to) attraction. And the E-section then excludes that E can "ignite" attraction in "virtual particles ("mx")", thus in local void (mv, E can only "ignite" E-contractions):

 

"Virtual particles" (possible mx) only exists in the meaning as defining a possible outcome of mx in space-contractions (not as "mv-suckers"=mv-attractors).

 

No, voids are voids, albeit containing, defining the possibility (property) of being able to become mx (given the existence of mx/x), and local finite voids cannot rationally create a thing so to speak on their own. Infinite void, thus E, has (in terms of properties) this infinity, then unlike finite voids, a principal difference which at least principally opens up the possibility for E-contractions, which then must (be able to) occur given the existence of mx/x given T2.

 

mx which further then in accordance with the "empiri" seems to have attraction force, be able to hold together more firmly, clusters of mx not only are like loose sand. An attraction force which given that mx, as the small things mx are, cannot send attraction particles (a) out, mx just only have (owns). And even if mx (absurdly) would be large advanced things, which can send a out, then a must be absurdly advanced in order to firstly be able to perform its task, to attract/pull other mx, and secondly to perhaps be able to find its way back to the (mother-)mx a is sent out from. Especially the latter requires incredibly absurd extremely advanced a, especially if mother-mx has moved, and furthermore of course the mother-mx is completed (quite) quickly if a not finds its way back to mother-mx, of course given that mother-mx not so to say is replenished, which leads into even more complicated discussions about mx if mx is assumed to be able to replenish (which they then cannot be once they become stable in accordance with the E-theory). No, the fundamental here is primarily that mx cannot send a out, as the small things mx are, and secondarily if mx nevertheless absurdly is assumed to be able to send a out, that a in order to perform its task, incredibly absurd must be incredibly advanced, especially if a also is assumed to be able to track back to its mother-mx. There are simpliciter no (rational) arguments whatsoever for the existence of a. But if mx have attraction force, then mx then just only have it (without sending a out, or anything else).

 

All (stable) mx are then rationally exactly the same (consisting of the same number of mv, the same "mass"), which provided that mx has attraction force excludes that mx can be repelling or neutral (neither attracting nor repelling), well, alternately it is conceivable, thus that mx can shift between being attracting, repellent and neutral, which (of course) again introduces that mx are absurdly advanced. No, if mx have attraction force, it is only attraction force mx have, and that constantly, if mx so to speak can turn on and off the attraction force, then mx again is defined to be absurdly advanced.

 

Rotation(/spin) is also a thinkable property for mx, but of course not that mx can make itself rotate, it again means that mx are absurdly advanced, that they have an inherent motor. No, if mx rotates, then it is because other mx attraction force (or thrusts) causes mx to rotate.

 

Summary:

 

All (stable) mx have the same mass (consists of the same n number of mv).

 

All mx have constant attraction force (which mx just only have(/owns) (no a is sent (shot) out (from mx))).

 

Other mx attraction forces (and thrusts) can perhaps cause mx to rotate (mx cannot rotate by its own force).

 

Further a question is what mx look like more specifically as consisting of compressed void, as a compressed number of mv? A more or less diffuse entity is closest at hand to (intuitively) assume. That mx can have some mathematical distinct form seems absurd. mv have no actual(/empirical) form as only existing principally, but is then rather a smallest "energy"-amount, which if they are thought superimposed (then n pieces) then defines a mx.

 

This which, as already is stated, strongly deviates from what is conventionally defined/assumed, where it then swarms of different kinds of mx. All "mx" (today then 61 pieces) except one, the Higgs boson, are furthermore so to speak empty shells, without mass, unless the Higgs boson is in the context, intuitively (in accordance with the E-theory) they are then nothing but empty space, nothing but "virtual mx". This just only strange (mysticism),* because mx cannot rationally decide anything for other mx per se (as then the Higgs boson is assumed to be able to), mx can only perhaps exogenously affect other mx, never endogenously (per se, mx can never affect other mx "intrinsically", but only perhaps attract or thrust other mx, and perhaps then cause mx to rotate).

 

All properties other than the previous (E-theoretically defined) which mx conventionally is assumed to have (own/possess) are rationally pure imagination, the only one of these (many) properties that have any rational intuition is charge, which can be assumed to be synonymous with attraction force, rather "negative", since "positive" semantically is something expanding (repelling). With which it then (by definition) can be spoken about attraction force as a negative charge. But more than that concerning "charge" cannot rationally be defined, thus any charge other than "negative", especially then "positive", not exists, rationally (other than then perhaps as irrational thoughts).

 

The World (E) can with this be argued not to be especially strange (rationally), even if the (mx-)attraction force and that that thrusted mx reasonably "jumps" in thrusting mx "jump"-directions are strange, if it now exists (in E, other than then as thought), but otherwise it may well be argued that E is intuitive (even that that E can start E-contractions from/in "still" space is intuitive, because there rationally is no alternative). This (of course) in sharp contrast to how it usually sounds, which can be summed up in: The more you know, the less you understand. But given the E-theory it is simpliciter the mind, especially that of man, that messes it up, especially when it interprets x={mx} which it perceives to exist per se beyond the mind. For the mind can of course define, see much more than what are rationally (E-theoretically) valid, especially those who affirm the irrational (including x which is a mix (assimilation) of rational and irrational x), those who only seek to ensure the rational consciously limits their mind, what they allow their mind to think:

 

The mind>E.

 

Given this especially rational ones can have a very hard time understanding irrational ones, especially socially, because rational ones (with their rational thinking) impossibly can understand irrational thinking, behaviour, it is just only nonsense to a rational. Irrational ones can certainly have as much difficulty understanding rational ones, but commonly they in any case have a greater possibility to understand rational ones, because rationality means being able to provide a basis for one's (rational) thinking, for example then Up, a principle which most irrational ones should be able to understand, even if they don't want to assume it.

 

Irrationals are characterized by that they have no problems whit assuming x ad hoc, rationals have extreme difficulty with that, even if they sometimes must, when they impossibly can see any sensible/rational explanation for certain behaviour/thinking. But rationals wants as far as possible to "see" the basis of everything it assumes, which in this text then culminate in the E-theory, as basic explanation for Everything; The rational sees it as irrational to think that something can exist beyond E (especially as E is infinite, which irrationals commonly of course have no problems with), but Everything then exists within E's framework, for a rational, E which then especially excludes holism, important to point out, but x={mx} are thus nothing more than that (Up’’), something x/E transcending (mysticism) not exists.

 

__________

* Which gets even more strange considered that "mx" is assumed to be points, to its form. The Higgs boson thus adds mass to a point (other than the one in which the Higgs boson resides), which of course means that this point is something more than only a point. Even mv are assumed (E-theoretically) to be something more than only empty space, especially assumed to include the property of being able to become mx, but to assume that a (single) p can be something more than a (single) p is just only too much, especially considering that p (mathematically) in accordance with t2 must be infinitely many in a p to be more compact than a single p.^

 

^ Defining the constituents of the space to be p, defines the mathematical space. Which can be seen as an approximation of the E-space, as shell, basic structure, in which then primarily points, curves, surfaces and volumes can be defined, as shells, as so to speak non-compact (mathematical, geometrical, purely abstract) forms or figures. The E-theory adds compactness, which mx then defines as (by definition) being more compact than mv. mx compactness and form is principally what it is in E-space, can more specifically only be "empirically" determined (of course given a belief in "empirical" experience); mx form cannot be mathematically determined, but then only perhaps be "empirically" determined, and this simpliciter because the mathematical space not is identical to the E-space, even if mx (actual, but of course unknown) form principally can be mathematically depicted given the p-concept (which is sufficiently fine for that).

 

Well, the compactness is then defined in the E-space by mx (then defined to be n compressed mv (mv which then is the smallest (pure) volume in the E-space, which then not have to be identical to the smallest volume in the mathematical space, which then is a tetrahedron)). In the mathematical space, given the existence of p in it, compactness must be defined by compact p, more compact than a single p, which means existence of (superpositionally) superimposed p's, which then according to t2 is absurd, which (of course) means that the mathematical space (rationally) only is this non-compact structure that was talked about above, only is a "field" which at each point consists of only one (non-compact) p (not consists of superimposed p's ({p}Ïp), but then only consists of one unique p (pÎp)). The p-concept must consequently be rejected if equivalently the E-space is to be "mathematically" defined. p which consequently not exists de facto in the E-space (which already has been stated/established), but of course they still may be used purely abstract in some E-theoretical context where they (analytically) fit.

 

 

Concerning FT

 

Fundamental logically everything is about definition, about thinking only, nothing is determined before it is determined, with which "continuous logic" is the only rational, that every step, sequence in the logic is intuitive, "seen", realized, because if not, there is something that not is determined by reason, but something that principally is taken for granted, something principally platonistic, although it need not be de facto platonistic (exist per se), which it given the Fundamental logic of course not is, but to (by reason(/sense)) not see why something is as it is, but only taking it for granted, is principally the same as that platonism rules for this something.

 

De facto platonism defines theories X to exist per se regardless of whether X is consciously or not, X exists empirically, can actually be said, even if X obviously not exists like for example an empirical tree (if such now exists), but principally platonistical X anyhow exists in exactly the same way as empirical trees (completely independent of (a) consciousness).

 

As already mentioned, it is more intuitive that platonistical X, just because of their equivalently empirical existence, can contain undecidable/independent x than that only imagined/defined X can (do that). But if Up’’ also is assumed to be valid for (for the sake of the analysis assumed existing) platonistical X, then FT also is valid for platonistical X. And FT rationally also is valid for platonistical X, precisely as Up’’ rationally is valid for empirical x. So platonists (or for that matter non-platonists) who want to defend Gödel's incompleteness theorems have to explain why they not considers Up’’ to be true, or rather T1, because even platonists may find it excessively absurd to assume that something can arise from(/in) or pass (over) into something which not exists at all. And even if T1 not is assumed, but then the existence of Nothing is a possibility, then undecidable/independent x arises from Nothing, which even if Nothing exists actually is absurd (albeit not categorically absurd, as it is if Nothing not exists). Yes, defending the existence of undecidable/independent x is a delicate task, which platonists simpliciter cannot tackle. The attempts that exists can be compared to the explanation of interaction in Physics, they can be claimed to get confused in the swarm of particles/sentences and see something (holistically) more be able to arise in this swarm per se, as a function of this swarm. Completely wrong, if this is broken down it lands (fundamentally) in that it is about emergence from (out of) Nothing (of attraction in interaction (excluded that it is a matter of a mere (pure) mx-attraction force, as then in the E-theory, and that mx can send a (attraction particles) out, which can pull/drag mx which they come to; Physics specifically excludes the former, is a little into the latter, but speaks vaguely of just interaction, of some mysterious interaction (of force) between particles, it not speaks of "hooks", which it explicitly must be about, unless it is about pure attraction force, with which the whole ends up in holism) and of existence of undecidable/independent x in the platonism).