* Even if there are cases in which it rationally in accordance with Up’’’ can be assumed to be valid, an example: In accordance with the E-theory x consisting of exactly the same number of mx "weighs" exactly the same (as clusters of mx ({mx}), because mx are exactly equal), by which it of course is rational to define (in accordance with Up’’’) these "weights" of x to be identical, to be one and the same "weight", despite these "weights" ({mx}) of course exists in different places, are different.



A little more regarding properties


When the experience/thoughts, x, are looked upon it/they can be sought to be described, y, which just is to describe x, is to line up charac-terizing properties, x’, for x:


x ® x’Îy.


For (the extension) y to have anything to do with x, y must intensionally contain x’. And y exactly describes x if y includes all x x’ (properties), which is possible for simpler thoughts, for example for 0* and p:


x=[non-extension (without position)] ® [non-extension (without position)]Î0*=y ® x=y.


x=[non-extension with position] ® [non-extension with position]Îp=y ® x=y.


This given that 0* (one property per se) and p (two properties per se) are seen per se, it so to speak not is thought contextually around 0* and p, which the thought almost inexorably (implicatively identically) wants, which if so is the case adds further properties to 0* and p. Regarding 0* the thought maybe (restated) wants to see 0* to exist everywhere and nowhere, which of course presupposes that 0* not is fixated, having position, which 0* principally has if 0* is surrounded by Nothing (0*=p as surrounded by Nothing), but for a "dyna-mic" ("free") 0* 0* must consequently not be surrounded by Nothing. Given this a position then is something fixated, in what way is p fixated if p not is surrounded by Nothing? Well, given the E-theory it is only a matter of definition, for example a p can (restated) be de-fined (somewhere) where ®  ends, p is given T2 pure thought, not something that exists (per se, as p in the "space web") equivalently(/-analogously) to (de facto existing) mx.


Anyway, so is then this with properties something that can be seen, defined (be thought) more broadly (about), or more narrowly (aro-und), and this thus already for the "simplest" phenomena (x). So that x=y, phenomenon=description, is more of an exception (than any-thing usually occurring). And that that x={mx} in accordance with the E-theory, is of course valid in narrowest meaning to mx-manifes-ted x, but in broader meaning of course not says so much. A human being for example is socially and for oneself much more than a bunch of mx, even if it of course not is a matter of something holistically (but about thoughts(={mx}), which not only thinks about mx, but "brainstorms" further, maybe about (irrational) holism, that man maybe really is something more than just only a cluster of mx (which she then rationally not is (Up’’))).


This "indeterminate", perhaps worth mentioning, has no bearing on Up, different x is a unique x if "they" have exactly, identically the sa-me properties if this number of properties so is determined ("complete" (per definition)) or indetermined ("incomplete" (per definition)).



Without "empiri"


Is "empirical" experience not assumed to be to hand, be present, especially then sight ("eyes"), hearing ("ears"), smell ("nose"), taste ("to-ngue"), touch (with fingers for example), but something still is lived, experienced, then the thought (of course) can spin, reason further from this something (on this basis). Something that (of course) can be characterized, defined, by which the concept of property (immediately) is to hand, present, defined. And the Nothing/T1-question (Nothing - Something) is almost immediately at hand as well. This by with which (of course) an E-theory is initiated.


Without "empiri" the thought (of course) entirely must rely on its own ability, some "empiri" gives no hint. Which when the E-theory defines mx then leads into to what shall be defined regarding mx-thrusts and mx-attraction, given that mx-movement exists, which the thought given Up’’ directly can conclude to be possible, because a static (fixed, completely still) cluster of mx not defines a moving thought, well, in that case a holistical thought (the thoughts swarm (ethereally) as non-mx around mx), but that can thus be excluded in accordance with Up’’:


mx-movement is possible existence.


Different mx can commonly stick together in three ways:


1) Not at all.


2) By attraction.


3) By "(grappling) hooks".


3 defines mx to be very advanced, especially as very small, well, as very small it is simply unreasonably that mx can throw out "grap-nels" (attached to a "line", which (mother-)mx then can "haul in"), or that mx can send out "hooks" (without a "line" between the "hook" and the (mother-)mx), very far, if at all. An almost comical image emerges of mx throwing/sending out small "(grappling) hooks" which pull at a (large) x (by hooking on to mxÎx). The image of just only attracting mx in case 2 is at least not so cluttered (but clean). But this with an "invisible hand" that brings mx against each other? 1 excludes that mx can hold together more firmly, mx exists in that case may-be just only side by side (if mx are neutral), without either attracting or repelling each other, mx can so to speak as much be together as be apart. The relation between (many) different mx can in that (neutrality) case (then) be compared to loose sand.


If 1-3 all are excluded, then there are no different x/mx, but only a (large) homogeneous x, which shrinks, contracts or elongates, expan-ds. But more specifically looked upon, especially at two equally large regions (close enough to each other) at a "string" between two po-sitions, then given T1 (that nothing can arise from or pass into Nothing) if these two regions move into each other (at contraction) they (superpositionally) merge with each other into a (more compact) region, and, conversely (at expansion) that new (less compact) regions are "born" when these new regions so to speak are pulled out of the more compact region, when the more compact region is divided into several (less compact) regions. So it is after all a matter of differences, of different phenomena, especially in the latter case when one region becomes several, by which the thought of a single homogeneous x (rationally) can be excluded, remaining is only the possibility that there so to speak are (long) threads (or "lines") between different mx, with which the whole in principle is back in 3. Which if that and that that mx can send/throw out "hooks" is excluded, of course leaves over to alternative 1 or 2.


It can be asked whether thoughts are thoughts if 1 (the neutrality case) is valid (repelling mx of course definitely not hold together), or are they in that case "loose sand", which not (concentrated) hold together, "which" simply not are thoughts? In addition, if 1 is assumed, then mx-movement must be explained by that thrust movements arise in space contractions, thrust movements which then per probability theory subsides, until all (non-completed) mx are completely still. Whit assumption of 2, there always is an "engine" that can keep mx-movement going on. Moreover, if the "empiri" briefly is presupposed, then it definitely speaks for 2, that it are "(grappling) hooks" that for example holds the Solar system together (by long "lines" between mx, or by mx sending/throwing "hooks" out which pull at other mx (and which then perhaps return to (mother-)mx)) is just absurd. No, 2 is the only rational alternative, both without and with the "empiri", stronger with the "empiri".


Thrust movement then? Well, without "empiri" it is of course not possible to "empirically" experience how for example billiard balls mo-ves in the "empiri", but the two commonly possible alternatives are quite possible to set up:


I) mx cleave (and complete each other) when they "jump" into each other; No thrust movement exists (all movement are (mx-)attraction movement; 2).


II) I is not valid, but mx thrusts each other.


It is enough that one mv separates off for mx to be completed, mx which of course >mv, so principally mx can do that if mx can separate (at least) one mv off from another mx, so mx "mass" gives no guidance to which alternative that is valid (I or II).


I defines a more deterministic, fateful world than II, x/mx is inexorably drawn in the direction with the strongest attraction force, in case II there is at least principally a possibility to break that determinism, but which which is valid is impossible to determine purely abstract.


But in this thrust-case it is probably so that "the empiri" must be used as an aid for a decision, and it definitely speaks for II, and addition-nally then for that thrusting mx passes directional information over to thrusted mx (to at least fairly "jump" in the thrusting mx "jump"-direction), which purely abstract then not is rational.


Purely abstract it is then possible to get very far, the "empiri" has more of a supporting (auxiliary axiomatic) function. The converse, wanting to see the "empiri" as the big part, the purely abstract more as a supporting function, cannot completely reject Up, because then there is no knowledge at all, because it is then not excluded that x just as well may be something else (y, as x), but Up must in that case be assumed ad hoc, when it is assumed to fit, because if Up is assumed to be generally valid, well, then of course it is back in the E-theory. But if Up not is assumed (in some specific case where Up is assumed not to fit), then there then is no knowledge to obtain, by which it (not to assume Up) of course is a meaningless assumption:


The only rational for knowledge is to assume Up generally valid:


The E-theory is commonly rationally valid (which not excludes discussion of certain aspects (of the E-theory)).


This of course pure (linguistic) abstraction, which may seem to be of no value, it may just as well be assumed, may seem (maybe in ac-cordance with some "empirical" observation), that the following is valid:


x*=[Up may be valid, but may just as well not be valid (perhaps according to some probability distribution: x=αUp+(1-α)(Up is not va-lid); αÎ(0,1))].


However, the (linguistically, more common) principle (than Up) that x=x must be assumed, otherwise x≠x (linguistically) of course can be valid (or specifically then, x* not needs to be x* (x*≠x*)), which of course also can be ignored, it be argued that this with (general) principles are nonsense, it is simpliciter what is (linguistically) assumed that is valid (for example then x*),  independent of (meta)prin-ciples such as x=x (which then defines that x*=x*). In that case it must of course be persuaded in some other way than by reference to principles, especially then Up, it must be based on the direct specific problem, which commonly means to set up all the alternatives and then reason out one or more of them, or perhaps all of them, which, given this work first of all means to discuss the concept of property and the Nothing - Something problem. The irrational who especially not wants to accept T1, but then wants to see Nothing at least be able to exist, can of course do so (however irrational it is for a rational), but it is still inside the Nothing - Something problem, the irrational and the rational are still so to speak somewhat on the same playing field if it not is about so much more than just a difference in view of T1, even if it of course have huge implications for what the World might look like, which especially (of course) the difference between the theories of relativity (which not assumes T1 to be valid) and the E-theory (which assumes T1 to be valid) manifests. This which com-pletely changes if the irrational begins to claim that there can be phenomena beyond this Nothing - Something problem, the irrational maybe accepts T2 empirically, but wants to claim that there is something (non-empirical) beyond E, then the rational definitely sees the irrational as just irrational.


To take this latter ad notam, perhaps a derivation of E without presumptions may be in place, where the principles are gradually assumed:



E without presumptions


A first definition (which simpliciter is assumed to be valid):


I) Nothing=[propertieslessness]:


An existing Nothing has (owns) the property x*=propertieslessness, x* which Nothing not has (owns) given I:


An existing Nothing both has and not has x* (at one and the same time):


T1 is valid; Nothing cannot both has and not has x*.


And T1 is of course not valid if Nothing can has and not has x* (Nothing has and not has x*). Each has here to decide what it find right, but the rational is assumed to be:


R1) That Nothing cannot both has and not has x*.


Given T1 it directly follows:


E is homogeneously continuous, infinitely ongoing in all directions (there exists no limits after which Nothing takes on).


Commonly it is valid that E’>E=min[E]=∞* can have limits after which Nothing takes on, but in the directions in which E’ continues in-definitely, so does E, with which E may appear to be greater than E’, thus that E’<∞*, but in that case E’ per definition is finite, because E=∞* is a smallest infinity, which E’ then per definition not is. So the following is valid:




T2) E=∞*:


x<∞*; x≠E; xÎE.


To buy T2 the previous (logical) reasoning of course must be bought, be bought that it must be kept to what is defined, that it is "forbid-den" to (contradictorily) go against it, to both assume something and not assume it: