mx which further then in accordance with the "empiri" seems to have attraction force, be able to hold together more firmly, clusters of mx not only are like loose sand. An attraction force which given that mx, as the small things mx are, cannot send attraction particles (a) out, mx just only have (owns). And even if mx (absurdly) would be large advanced things, which can send a out, then a must be absurdly advanced in order to firstly be able to perform its task, to attract/pull other mx, and secondly to perhaps be able to find its way back to the (mother)mx a is sent out from. Especially the latter requires incredibly absurd extremely advanced a, especially if mothermx has moved, and furthermore of course the mothermx is completed (quite) quickly if a not finds its way back to mothermx, of course given that mothermx not so to say is replenished, which leads into even more complicated discussions about mx if mx is assumed to be able to replenish (which they then cannot be once they become stable in accordance with the Etheory). No, the fundamental here is primarily that mx cannot send a out, as the small things mx are, and secondarily if mx nevertheless absurdly is assumed to be able to send a out, that a in order to perform its task, incredibly absurd must be incredibly advanced, especially if a also is assumed to be able to track back to its mothermx. There are simpliciter no (rational) arguments whatsoever for the existence of a. But if mx have attraction force, then mx then just only have it (without sending a out, or anything else).
All (stable) mx are then rationally exactly the same (consisting of the same number of mv, the same "mass"), which provided that mx has attraction force excludes that mx can be repelling or neutral (neither attracting nor repelling), well, alternately it is conceivable, thus that mx can shift between being attracting, repellent and neutral, which (of course) again introduces that mx are absurdly advanced. No, if mx have attraction force, it is only attraction force mx have, and that constantly, if mx so to speak can turn on and off the attraction force, then mx again is defined to be absurdly advanced.
Rotation(/spin) is also a thinkable property for mx, but of course not that mx can make itself rotate, it again means that mx are absurdly advanced, that they have an inherent motor. No, if mx rotates, then it is because other mx attraction force (or thrusts) causes mx to rotate.
Summary:
All (stable) mx have the same mass (consists of the same n number of mv).
All mx have constant attraction force (which mx just only have(/owns) (no a is sent (shot) out (from mx))).
Other mx attraction forces (and thrusts) can perhaps cause mx to rotate (mx cannot rotate by its own force).
Further a question is what mx look like more specifically as consisting of compressed void, as a compressed number of mv? A more or less diffuse entity is closest at hand to (intuitively) assume. That mx can have some mathematical distinct form seems absurd. mv have no actual(/empirical) form as only existing principally, but is then rather a smallest "energy"amount, which if they are thought superimposed (then n pieces) then defines a mx.
This which, as already is stated, strongly deviates from what is conventionally defined/assumed, where it then swarms of different kinds of mx. All "mx" (today then 61 pieces) except one, the Higgs boson, are furthermore so to speak empty shells, without mass, unless the Higgs boson is in the context, intuitively (in accordance with the Etheory) they are then nothing but empty space, nothing but "virtual mx". This just only strange (mysticism),* because mx cannot rationally decide anything for other mx per se (as then the Higgs boson is assumed to be able to), mx can only perhaps exogenously affect other mx, never endogenously (per se, mx can never affect other mx "intrinsically", but only perhaps attract or thrust other mx, and perhaps then cause mx to rotate).
All properties other than the previous (Etheoretically defined) which mx conventionally is assumed to have (own/possess) are rationally pure imagination, the only one of these (many) properties that have any rational intuition is charge, which can be assumed to be synonymous with attraction force, rather "negative", since "positive" semantically is something expanding (repelling). With which it then (by definition) can be spoken about attraction force as a negative charge. But more than that concerning "charge" cannot rationally be defined, thus any charge other than "negative", especially then "positive", not exists, rationally (other than then perhaps as irrational thoughts).
The World (E) can with this be argued not to be especially strange (rationally), even if the (mx)attraction force and that that thrusted mx reasonably "jumps" in thrusting mx "jump"directions are strange, if it now exists (in E, other than then as thought), but otherwise it may well be argued that E is intuitive (even that that E can start Econtractions from/in "still" space is intuitive, because there rationally is no alternative). This (of course) in sharp contrast to how it usually sounds, which can be summed up in: The more you know, the less you understand. But given the Etheory it is simpliciter the mind, especially that of man, that messes it up, especially when it interprets x={mx} which it perceives to exist per se beyond the mind. For the mind can of course define, see much more than what are rationally (Etheoretically) valid, especially those who affirm the irrational (including x which is a mix (assimilation) of rational and irrational x), those who only seek to ensure the rational consciously limits their mind, what they allow their mind to think:
The mind>E.
Given this especially rational ones can have a very hard time understanding irrational ones, especially socially, because rational ones (with their rational thinking) impossibly can understand irrational thinking, behaviour, it is just only nonsense to a rational. Irrational ones can certainly have as much difficulty understanding rational ones, but commonly they in any case have a greater possibility to understand rational ones, because rationality means being able to provide a basis for one's (rational) thinking, for example then Up, a principle which most irrational ones should be able to understand, even if they don't want to assume it.
Irrationals are characterized by that they have no problems whit assuming x ad hoc, rationals have extreme difficulty with that, even if they sometimes must, when they impossibly can see any sensible/rational explanation for certain behaviour/thinking. But rationals wants as far as possible to "see" the basis of everything it assumes, which in this text then culminate in the Etheory, as basic explanation for Everything; The rational sees it as irrational to think that something can exist beyond E (especially as E is infinite, which irrationals commonly of course have no problems with), but Everything then exists within E's framework, for a rational, E which then especially excludes holism, important to point out, but x={mx} are thus nothing more than that (Up’’), something x/E transcending (mysticism) not exists.
__________ * Which gets even more strange considered that "mx" is assumed to be points, to its form. The Higgs boson thus adds mass to a point (other than the one in which the Higgs boson resides), which of course means that this point is something more than only a point. Even mv are assumed (Etheoretically) to be something more than only empty space, especially assumed to include the property of being able to become mx, but to assume that a (single) p can be something more than a (single) p is just only too much, especially considering that p (mathematically) in accordance with t2 must be infinitely many in a p to be more compact than a single p.^
^ Defining the constituents of the space to be p, defines the mathematical space. Which can be seen as an approximation of the Espace, as shell, basic structure, in which then primarily points, curves, surfaces and volumes can be defined, as shells, as so to speak noncompact (mathematical, geometrical, purely abstract) forms or figures. The Etheory adds compactness, which mx then defines as (by definition) being more compact than mv. mx compactness and form is principally what it is in Espace, can more specifically only be "empirically" determined (of course given a belief in "empirical" experience); mx form cannot be mathematically determined, but then only perhaps be "empirically" determined, and this simpliciter because the mathematical space not is identical to the Espace, even if mx (actual, but of course unknown) form principally can be mathematically depicted given the pconcept (which is sufficiently fine for that).
Well, the compactness is then defined in the Espace by mx (then defined to be n compressed mv (mv which then is the smallest (pure) volume in the Espace, which then not have to be identical to the smallest volume in the mathematical space, which then is a tetrahedron)). In the mathematical space, given the existence of p in it, compactness must be defined by compact p, more compact than a single p, which means existence of (superpositionally) superimposed p's, which then according to t2 is absurd, which (of course) means that the mathematical space (rationally) only is this noncompact structure that was talked about above, only is a "field" which at each point consists of only one (noncompact) p (not consists of superimposed p's ({p}Ïp), but then only consists of one unique p (pÎp)). The pconcept must consequently be rejected if equivalently the Espace is to be "mathematically" defined. p which consequently not exists de facto in the Espace (which already has been stated/established), but of course they still may be used purely abstract in some Etheoretical context where they (analytically) fit.
Concerning FT
Fundamental logically everything is about definition, about thinking only, nothing is determined before it is determined, with which "continuous logic" is the only rational, that every step, sequence in the logic is intuitive, "seen", realized, because if not, there is something that not is determined by reason, but something that principally is taken for granted, something principally platonistic, although it need not be de facto platonistic (exist per se), which it given the Fundamental logic of course not is, but to (by reason(/sense)) not see why something is as it is, but only taking it for granted, is principally the same as that platonism rules for this something.
De facto platonism defines theories X to exist per se regardless of whether X is consciously or not, X exists empirically, can actually be said, even if X obviously not exists like for example an empirical tree (if such now exists), but principally platonistical X anyhow exists in exactly the same way as empirical trees (completely independent of (a) consciousness).
As already mentioned, it is more intuitive that platonistical X, just because of their equivalently empirical existence, can contain undecidable/independent x than that only imagined/defined X can (do that). But if Up’’ also is assumed to be valid for (for the sake of the analysis assumed existing) platonistical X, then FT also is valid for platonistical X. And FT rationally also is valid for platonistical X, precisely as Up’’ rationally is valid for empirical x. So platonists (or for that matter nonplatonists) who want to defend Gödel's incompleteness theorems have to explain why they not considers Up’’ to be true, or rather T1, because even platonists may find it excessively absurd to assume that something can arise from(/in) or pass (over) into something which not exists at all. And even if T1 not is assumed, but then the existence of Nothing is a possibility, then undecidable/independent x arises from Nothing, which even if Nothing exists actually is absurd (albeit not categorically absurd, as it is if Nothing not exists). Yes, defending the existence of undecidable/independent x is a delicate task, which platonists simpliciter cannot tackle. The attempts that exists can be compared to the explanation of interaction in Physics, they can be claimed to get confused in the swarm of particles/sentences and see something (holistically) more be able to arise in this swarm per se, as a function of this swarm. Completely wrong, if this is broken down it lands (fundamentally) in that it is about emergence from (out of) Nothing (of attraction in interaction (excluded that it is a matter of a mere (pure) mxattraction force, as then in the Etheory, and that mx can send a (attraction particles) out, which can pull/drag mx which they come to; Physics specifically excludes the former, is a little into the latter, but speaks vaguely of just interaction, of some mysterious interaction (of force) between particles, it not speaks of "hooks", which it explicitly must be about, unless it is about pure attraction force, with which the whole ends up in holism) and of existence of undecidable/independent x in the platonism).
That Gödel formally proves the existence of undecidable/independent x depends on N, and is with that of no importance, because that formalism (that builds on N), Classical logic, thus simpliciter is wrong/irrational. Because already (the assumption of) N (the Negation) principally defines this with undecidable/independent x, defines the existence of x which (platonistically) unprovable exists per se (equivalently empirically), N just only (platonistically) is valid (thus either (the unique) x or the (the unique) y, then per assumption of N, it is thus the matter of platonism per assumption), precisely what also is valid (is assumed to be valid, or then Classically logically is proven to be valid, of course provided N) for undecidable/independent x; Given N, N is valid for every z within X domain, if z so are provable within/by X or not, x or y is true for z, then given N. For example it is (then) valid that it is unprovable if mx have attraction force in the Etheory (the "empiri" is then in the Etheory taken to help answering this question), a question (z) which of course is within the Etheory’s domain/area of definition, a question which if N would have been valid in the Etheory of course (platonistically) would have had an answer, namely then either x or y, where x and y of course nearest define the two alternatives that mx either has attraction force or not (a notcase which then negated in accordance with Dl defines (brings back to) that mx possesses attraction force, which simpliciter is absurd (how can something so common as this notcase bring back to something that specific, or what does this notcase more specifically define?), clearly shows how absurd Classical logic is). Fundamental logically it is then about definition, plain and simple (only), if especially then mx has attraction force, or not, if one of these alternatives (empirically, genuinely, de facto) is true, and the other false, is irrelevant, yes, nothing that at all can be determined, but then only can be ASSUMED, defined something about (in accordance with the thinking, the experience, especially then a rationally thinking, which then (especially) this work seeks to give an idea of (what it is)), and in this then perhaps the "empiri" ((the) thinking which is assumed to refer, correspond to empiri) can give a hint:
Counterproof is in accordance with Kp to show that an x contradicts some for true held x in the theory in question.* If x unusually cannot be counterproved, then x must be provable/derivable in the theory in question, if x now not wants to be assumed as an axiom (especially then perhaps on the basis of "empiri", as then what is valid for the (mx)attraction force), in accordance with FT; If (nonaxiomatic) x is assumed to belong to a theory without being able to be counterproved or proved, then it is simpliciter the matter of irrational undecidable/independent x in accordance with FT.
__________ * That is thus sufficient for contradictoriness, need not necessarily be the question of an (absurd) psuperpositionality, which in accordance with N is a conventionally common view, that both x and y(=nonx) in N, "contradictorily", cannot be valid at the same time, the "Law of (non)contradiction" ((x Ù y)’; N). The Fundamental logic thus defines much more commonly, "loosely", or rather actually very much more strictly. It is enough with the smallest deviation from something assumed true (x), then this deviation is false (x(=y)≠x is false (for x)).
Principia Mathematica
Principia Mathematica, at the pages 9497, reproduced on the website Law of thought, defines these six "primitive propositions" of importance (which here are defined with = instead of ® (É), which changes nothing, because the intension of ®, just like with =, is that the left side can be exchanged for the right side, well, rather it is better with =, because ® loses the (weaker) meaning (≠[=]) to be able to implicate without it being the matter of implicative identity if [®]=[=]):
2) (x Ú x)=x(; x=(x Ú x)).
3) y=(x Ú y).
4) (x Ú y)=(y Ú x).
5) (x Ú (y Ú z)=(y Ú (x Ú z).
6) (y ® z)=((x Ú y) ® (x Ú z)).
7) If x is an elementary proposition, x’=y is an elementary proposition (=N).
