*** Given that mx "jumps" (with which it rationally then is that thrusted mx "jumps" unconditionally stochastic), which then is the rati-onal/logical (continuous movement (p-long movements) is irrational/illogical). However, if continuous movement is (irrationally) assu-med anyway, then it is rationally (intuitively) that thrusted mx’ moves depending on how thrusting mx moves into mx’, collides with mx’. So in some sense the alternatives must be weighed against each other, even if the basic problem of continuous/discontinuous move-ment is more fundamental than how the phenomenon of collision between mx looks like, is defined. And as for that, it only is valid that discontinuous movement is rational/logical, continuous movement not. "The empiri" will probably never give a hint here, because it has to go down to the utmost micro level for this to be "seen":


Given the E-theory it is regarding "empirical" knowledge, when it really concerns empirical (objective) knowledge, (outmost) incident mx which hit receptors which send signals (even that outmost mx of course) to the brain (in humans, which of course also outmost are mx (including the brain)). The brain interprets these signals, and can never know, firstly whether it really is a matter of (objectively) incident mx, because it might just as well be the brain per se that invents an impression, a thought, and secondly the brain can never, if it is the matter of incident mx (which then per se never can be known), know if these incident mx, given the process of the brain and the process between receptors and brain, correctly depicts, corresponds to empirical objects. It can only be ASSUMED that that is the case, the "em-piri" only gives a hint of what empirically is valid. De facto it is the brain that determines what is "empirical"/empirical valid, simpliciter because the brain in accordance with the foregoing never can be sure if it really is about empirical knowledge.


Given this the only rational is to perhaps believe in clear "empirical" information, which mostly is about information that seems to come directly from the empiri, not mediated through/by instruments. E-theoretically it especially important is about the assumption that x at-tracts each other, hold together, "empirically" it appears to be so, despite it rationally is absurd, outmost then that mx (just only) can at-tract each other (that an invisible hand can bring mx towards each other). The brain is faced with a dilemma here, which should it believe, the rational or the irrational/absurd (some other options not exists, given an assumption of mx)? Also the assumption that thrusted mx "jumps" reasonably in thrusting mx "jump"-directions is then an "empirical" assumption, because thrusted mx then rationally "jumps" un-conditionally stochastic. But "empirically" thrusted x moves more determinate (for example a billiard ball), unequivocally so, to deny that requires that the brain's "empirical" perception completely be rejected, declared strictly false, which well is to take it too far.


Direct "empirical" information is thus highly problematic, and even more problematic it becomes when instruments (devices) are invol-ved, when an instrument (according to "empirical" perception), a "machine", mediates (is assumed to mediate) "empirical" information. For it is evident that the machine especially can deliver information just only created in the machine, any empirical input in/to the machi-ne (which of course also is about (incident) mx (with an angle of incidence)) is so to speak lost (or non-existing), the machine simply ig-nores it perhaps, the machine just only delivers the information it (by the engineers) is programmed/created to deliver. But even if the ma-chine actually processes input, incident mx, then of course the question is whether this process can be trusted, that the machine not distort the information incident mx perhaps provides (about the empiri).


But most important in any case is the interpretation of direct (by the (human) brain interpreted as being direct) as well of indirect (by machines/instruments mediated, which then the (human) brain interprets to be) "empirical" information, all such information can almost always, if not always, be differently interpreted, especially if it is about subtle experiments, where perhaps numbers, plots and graphs which a machine prints out must be interpreted. In the foregoing especially two interpretations of experiments have been made which differ from conventional interpretation, the first:


Einstein assumes that light not is captured/glued by attraction(/gravitation), which then gives rise to the theories of relativity, given that measuring instruments firmly anchored on (to) the Earth's surface not can measure relative speed of light of incident light that the instru-ment measures the speed of, which they also cannot according to actual experiments. E-theoretically light is captured/glued by (mx-)at-traction, with which such firmly anchored measuring instruments simpliciter cannot measure relative light speed of incident light, for that the measuring instrument must be set in motion.


The second:


Quantum physicists assumes that small particles can interfere with themselves (why that would cause particles to take different paths?), to explain particle scattering, that small particles not moves linearly (especially in the "Double-slit experiment"). E-theoretically it simplici-ter is so that small particles (consisting of fewer mx) moves wobbly, non-linearly. For more linear movement the "particles" must be lar-ger (consist of more mx), and this is exactly what especially the Double-slit experiment shows, directly interpreted, without the introduc-tion of "interference"; This concept of interference, including the concept of waves, probably was adopted given a continued assumption of the classical assumption that particles moves linearly, instead of simpliciter assuming that (small) particles moves non-linearly, they entangled (complicated) it with this with interference and particles being waves. Distinction must be made between attraction-movement and thrust-movement, thrust-movement as it is about in the Double-slit experiment, the particles are shot(/thrusted/pushed) through slits against a plate behind the slits. Attraction-movement on the other hand gives almost evident rise to more linear movement, towards the attracting mx. Of course depending on how the attracting mx moves, if they moves, then of course (rationally) the attracted mx bends their paths in the direction the attracting mx moves.^


^ This is a good example of that phenomena rationally almost gives themselves, of course it is possible to assume otherwise, but it is clea-rly irrational, at least in my mind, and I am convinced that most people see it that way, thus (with ones "inner eye") sees that by mx’ at-tracted mx cannot move in any direction other than the direction of attraction (towards mx’).^^ This rationally intuitive is so to speak eve-rywhere in the E-theory, there is so to speak a rational (given) path to walk, at least concerning the most basic. Take for example further E, given T1, there is, given T1, as well as no alternative to the assumption of space-contractions (eternal mx excluded (T2 assumed)), the conventional that points, positions ("virtual particles") in E can "suck up" space, the (rational) intuition directly says no to, it simply ex-pressed makes positions being something categorically more than pure space, or then a point (p) if it is about that. Even the most irratio-nal probably hesitate to assume that a p can be a "space sucker" (which of course not hindered the physicists from nevertheless assuming roughly equivalently that, but that can be blamed on a confused, far too complicated definition, so that they lost their way, not sees clear-ly). Well, this then examples of rationally thinking, which then more or less given, leads to conclusions (on the "path").


^^ "Empirically" it is only possible to make indirect assumptions about mx, if any mx, because the human brain "empirically" has no ac-cess to the outmost (mx-)micro-level. The human brain "empirically" only sees "big splotches" as objects (when it interprets incident mx in the chain that perhaps were started by incident mx in to an eye), even when it comes to what it thinks it sees in instruments, it is far from perhaps "seeing" mx. And consequently it is a matter of from the "splotches" interpreting what perhaps is valid for mx, if any mx. With which man never can be sure that what she (indirectly) assumes for mx by observing the "splotches" is valid. For certainty direct access to mx is required. And even if it seemingly is present, it is in accordance with the foregoing then in any case only a matter of the brain's perception of the "empiri"/the empiri. But the "hint" can in any case be assumed to be more relevant if it is about "mx-level" than about "splotch-level".


An "mx-level" which then not is present, and probably never will be present, because given/provided that it is about mx, mx must be ex-amined, "dissected" with other mx, other materially is too big, rough to be able to examine mx with. That mx literally can be seen is out of the question, the only thing that in that case can be seen is from mx reflected, bounced off mx, small "points", in order for an image to be created many "points" are required, which an mx simpliciter not can give rise to as being a "point", which then perhaps other incident mx after a collision can bounce away from, and of course only give the "image" of a "point", if these bouncing away mx can be "captu-red". Seeking to destroy mx, by bombarding it with (other) mx, in which case then mx (E-theoretically) is completed, requires that mx somehow can be "seen" to disappear/complete, just because mx completes, thus just only disappears, turns into being mv (again), there is nothing (no "energy")^^^ to measure (out), but this disappearance must then somehow be literally "seen". Regarding any attraction force (or other force), it is about "seeing" mx attracting other mx (or not), thus that mx in the vicinity of each other move towards each other, without any other (exogenous) force being involved, it only (perhaps) is about attraction. In groups/clusters of mx (especially then in slightly larger particles) thrusts also are involved, which are impossible to isolate, but for a categorical statement of attraction force of mx, an ("empirical") proof of it should consist of only two mx. And perhaps individual mx attraction force is too weak, so that only two mx not moves towards each other, with which of course no conclusion can be drawn, well, the direct conclusion would of course be that mx are neutral, a wrong conclusion of course if it is so that mx has attraction force, but that it takes mx in a group for it to have an impact. This as said only hypothetically, that mx-level can be reached is as said almost out of the question.


^^^ Yes, the mx-"energy" from completed mx flows so to speak out into the room, becomes one with it (mx diffuses (out into the room) so to speak (and with that then becomes one with the room)), with which the "energy" from the completed mx then principally are the (pure) volume mx has passed into being, with which the whole becomes extremely difficult to measure in any way, without going further into that. Physically measurable can without further ado (outmost) be claimed to be about (non-completed) mx, the "energy" are mx, a {mx}, not a {mv} as "energy" actually is (the "energy" that then can create mx, and mx then again transitions into when they completes).



Addition II


Context Nothing


Mathematically there is the volume, plane/surface, curve, point (non-extension with position): p, and non-extension (without position): 0*.


An existing p has commonly a surrounding, or not. If not, then p is surrounded by Nothing(=propertieslessness), Nothing immediately takes on "after" p:


p)=Nothing, where p) defines a p directly "after" p; Nothing surrounds p.


If there exists a distance between p and p), then Nothing not exists (there) between p and p), since Nothing as propertiesless of course not is a distance (a curve), and consequently there is no distance between p and p) if p is surrounded by Nothing:


p=p); Nothing surrounds p.


So (also) p is consequently Nothing if Nothing exists surrounding p.


By analogy it can be stated:


0*=p); p)=Nothing is a p directly "after" 0*; Nothing surrounds 0*.


So even 0* is thus Nothing if Nothing exists surrounding 0*.


So if p or 0* de facto exists, then they are not surrounded by Nothing (if p or 0* de facto not exists, Nothing prevails, so to speak every-where): 0* as positionless principally directly spans an infinite volume out, in all directions (0* exists, so to speak, everywhere and no-where). p in principle does the same, since a p can be defined anywhere, and is then (as existing) not surrounded by Nothing, which of course also spans an infinite volume in all directions out (V; V which then further can be stated to be =E).


Is p or 0* de facto existing, and thus also V? Yes, because it is evident that Nothing not prevails (everywhere), this text for example can-not be read if Nothing prevails, and if this text is read, then a p can be defined to exist for example (somewhere) where the arrow points ® , a p which of course cannot be seen, since p is non-extended, but p can be assumed to exist there anyway. This however not rule out that Nothing can exist some time, although then not now, at the time of writing (in which then Nothing not prevails (everywhere)):


If Nothing exists, can exist, then it intuitively is absurd that x≠Nothing can arise from(/in) an existing Nothing, but it cannot be categori-cally ruled out, just because of the existence of Nothing, because it is not absurd that existence can lead to (imply) other existence. And it is also not absurd that x could turn into Nothing, if Nothing can exist, for the same reason as in the previous sentence. But the existence or non-existence of Nothing cannot be determined on the basis of the foregoing, but some other argumentation is consequently required for that:


Nothing (as propertiesless) not has the property that x can arise from Nothing, or the property that x can turn into Nothing. The latter can directly be ruled out as irrational, since Nothing (rationally) cannot determine anything about/for x. But commonly x may very well be able to turn into Nothing, given that Nothing can exist, if Nothing not exists on the other hand it is however excessively absurd to assu-me that x can turn into Nothing, and with that of course be, exist as, this non-existent Nothing (an absurd p-superpositionality). The for-mer is more ingenious, but Nothing also not has the property that x cannot arise from Nothing, which semantically opens up the possibi-lity that x can arise from Nothing. So commonly it is completely open whether x can arise from an existing Nothing, or not. If on the other hand Nothing not exists, it is however a given that x cannot arise from Nothing, because it is excessively absurd to assume that x can arise from something non-existent.


So this then not determined the question of the existence of Nothing, but it has to go back to the argumentation to/for T1 for determina-tion of the existence of Nothing (just only an ad hoc assumption of the existence of Nothing, or not,* ruled out, such an assumption is (of course) unserious, irrational), T1 which then defines that Nothing not exists (at all).



* "Not" includes (the assumption) not to take a position on the issue at all, which then of course also is unserious (sloppy nearest), which is obvious given the preceding, because the being or not being of Nothing rationally thus has enormous importance.



Think void instead of Nothing, and concerning mx


T1 which then further leads to the (ultimate) conclusion that 0 ® mx and that mx ® 0, void ({mv}) gives rise to mx (creation), and mx eventually turns into void (again, completion). So it is thus about void/volume, not Nothing. A rational should never (given T1) speak of Nothing, but think/speak void, emptiness (in the void, empty room). The sentence: There is nothing, must consequently rationally be in-terpreted as that void prevails, especially where something (x) perhaps could have been (the wanted wrench, for example). An empty spa-ce which "empirically" of course is filled with a lot of other things (a lot of scrap in a storage room for example), if the context now not is out in space, where this whit an empty space of course is more de facto relevant (if the wrench not is there, in the void; A void that usual-ly not is so empty in the Universe, for example light is often in the (Universe's) void, but of course much else also can be there, which the naked eye cannot see, outmost then mx which then (as stable) moves, thrusts mv away; If you think about this for a bit, you soon realize that (especially) the Universe is totally black, or how it now should be expressed, that it is the brain that especially puts "light" on the Universe through its interpretation of then (outmost) incident mx, or interprets other incident mx as coldness and others perhaps as warmth: Light, warmth, coldness, etcetera are thus the brain's interpretation of various incident mx (in a chain which then results in the brain's interpretation). There may thus be a connection (correspondence) between incident mx and the brain's interpretation of this inci-dence, but it is quite obvious that large, if not huge discrepancy can prevail between the brain's interpretation and what actually is going on, then concerning the incident mx).