L=tc2 /h:

 

II) mL=mc2 t/h.

 

Where mL defines that what Einstein calls bezugsmolluske, string mollusc, an m over its path (then of length L), and since m is light, this of course can be seen as a (coiling) light snake or light worm.

 

II can be rewritten:

 

mhhL/t'h=mc2:

 

III) ph=mc2; p=mh, th=L:

 

dm/dh>0.

 

The mass thus increases if h increases, and vice versa, which Einstein calls the mass effect.

 

And III can further well known be written:

 

E=mc2; E=ph.

 

This is strange in so many ways, first and foremost because the h-movements are fictitious? In some way it's well about Einstein wanting to connect the string molluscs with how we perceive the "empiri", but it is still the c-movement that is the real one (according to Einstein then)? If we perceive reality wrong, then it is in no way right to bring this wrongful perception into the world definition. This Einstein corrects in the so-called general theory of relativity in which the fictitious aspect is removed, it is only seen to the actual c-movement, which he assumes to be slower in thicker, more compact, bundles of light, and vice versa: the c-movement goes faster in less compact light bundles. A compactness Einstein defines g (gravitation) for: The more compact (light bundles), the higher g, and vice versa, which then of course defines c to be a function of g:

 

c=c(g); dc/dg<0.

 

Well, then of course it is possible to specify/define further, but it is content with this, it is evident that this is extremely strange, and has nothing to do with how we "empirically" perceive reality. I'm not a stranger to the fact that we can misperceive reality (take for example that that mx "jumps"; Most people well perceives(/assumes) that x moves continuously through space, but thus (rationally) not), but there are limits. Is it unappealing to assume that the Earth's g-field captures, "glues" photons (or to assume T1), then a direct proof of the existence of relative speed of light must be performed. Perhaps by putting a c-meter in the nose of a space rocket and gas max towards the Sun and measuring the speed of incident sunlight. Or maybe build a long rotating arm at the outer end of which a c-measuring instru-ment measures the speed of incident laser light. Unless in particular the c-meter "glues" the light, which not is very likely, then it should measure relative speed of light and Einstein's theories of relativity be confuted. 

 

__________

* Quantum mechanics is usually claimed to be strange, but in comparison to the theories of relativity it is a miracle of clarity, it overde-fines however (can rationally be stated without further ado), especially concerning the number of mx, the E-theory then only sees one kind of mx, quantum mechanics currently sees 61 different kinds of mx (see the last reference). And quantum mechanics defines a little strange sometimes, especially when it comes to the wobbly movement of small particles: To define this wobbliness quantum mechanics define a "wave function", which they want to make to that the particle in itself is a wave (so-called wave/particle-duality), well, of course particles consisting of many mx perhaps can be smeared out into a "wave", but the particles in question are very small, with which it in that case consequently only can be the matter of small "waves". Sees the particles={mx} being "waves" not be constituted of {mx}, then it of course is the matter of mv (E-theoretically), the particles have thus then been completed, which they in the context not have. Sees the particles being "waves" being something non-material (non-mx(≠mv); Especially then an mx can be transformed into this non-mx="wa-ve"), then the quantum mechanics have ended up in the mystique together with the theories of relativity.^

 

Quantum mechanics also wants to see "virtual particles" endogenously be able to "suck up" mv, no, not in accordance with the E-section. They assume that in context of an assumption that x+(-x)=0 ("annihilation"), mostly just a strange assumption: E-theoretically mx may perhaps "annihilate", cleave and complete each other, if many/several mx "jumps" in to each other. Two mx cannot "annihilate", cleave each other, then no thrust-movement would exist (contradicting "the empiri"), but mx-cleaving ("annihilation") consequently requires that several mx "jumps" in to each other, in the same place, in the same position ("p"). And even if two mx could cleave each other, that pos-sibility depends on mx (self)weight (the number of mv mx consists of) and compactness (how centred mx ({mv}(=mx)) is around a posi-tion), that possibility simply depends on the "brute force" of mx, not on some mysterious plus or minus (x and anti-x). And given that mx are exactly equal (which they then rationally are), it can only be about cleaving (and completion), or not, of both mx. And provided that thrust-movement is possible, then thus two mx which "jumps" into each other not cleaves each other, but they then thrusts (on) each other.

 

Another assumption quantum mechanics makes difficult to accept, is that particles apart from "communication" between thrusting and thrusted mx (when they are superpositionally superimposed on each other), also can "communicate" with each other at a distance from each other ("entanglement"), and this momentarily(/immediately) (principally on time≤tp), which means at infinite speed, which given T2 simpliciter not is possible (it defines these particles to be E). If it is a matter of finite speed, then it is a matter of out-sent a, with which it E-theoretically must be a matter of large (very advanced) "particles". That mx can "communicate" with other mx at a distance from each other can E-theoretically without further ado be excluded (because mx E-theoretically are "dead" entities).

 

** To talk about "photons", particles is actually wrong, it is more about a homogeneous "sausage", more compact in brighter areas, and less compact in less bright areas, and Nothing where no light "flows". Physicists therefore speak of fields rather than particles, although they also use the concept of particles, particles which are assumed to be points (to their shape), with which they in one way avoid that the theory is contradictory, but the "fields" with this only consists of points, varying compactness not exists, which so to speak requires that p can exist (superpositionally) superimposed, equivalently to how mv in the E-theory are assumed to be able to exist superimposed and de-fine mx, which mathematically simpliciter not is possible, or rather absurd, since more compact p in accordance with dp=∞p consequent-ly requires that an infinite number of p must be superimposed in order for a more compact p to be defined, which by extension means that more compact areas in/of the string mollusc must consist of an infinite number of superimposed light rays, which of course just only is absurd.

 

^ The equivalent of course also are valid for mx, which "smeared out" of course principally are extremely small "waves", yes, given that mx "jumps" (and Up), they simply not are "waves", but unchanged mx, how mx now looks like, in their different positions (if any). And furthermore then single mx cannot move, but for that it then is required that mx exists in group with other mx, so that a Fr-move-ment can be formed, but single mx is then perhaps only attracted towards something, for example then towards the Earth if they were to come outside an mx-canon.

 

Addition

 

So-called Classical logic assumes very restricted (narrow-minded), contradicting Ia och Ib:

 

N*) x  y.

 

Thus that a unique x implicates a unique y, which (implicatively identically) also can be written:

 

N*) (x  y)=(y  x),(x  y).

 

This in accordance with an assumption Classical logic makes, called the Negation, which all underlying assumptions Classical logic ma-kes defines:

 

N) x=y(=x=y); y=x(=y=x); x,y≠0, (x  y)=(x  y):

 

z=x,y.

 

N implicates N* och N*, albeit in more strict(/restricted) meaning than what N* and N* defines, implicatively identically it is given N valid that [or including some additional Classically logically fundamentally: T) N=(x  y),(x  y),(y  x),x,y=N(; N)]:

 

N=(x  y):

 

"N*") x  y.

 

That it Classically logically is a matter of greater strictness is shown by the (Classically logical) proof of "N*":

 

"N*") (x  y)=y,x=(y  y),(x  x)=(y  x),(x  y); N(/T), Tp;

 

Tp) x=(x); (x)=x.

 

Tp is a tautological principle Classical logic assumes, which then especially defines that y=(y  y); Tp is not identical whit Up; Tp defi-nes (possible) existence of superclones, Up excludes existence of superclones.

 

Classically logically "N*" is over-interpreted to define N*, N* in which it not is given that x=y and that y=x, which then is valid in accordance whit N. Such over-interpretation (which is legion in Classical logic) is not the big problem with Classical logic, but that is the assumption of the equivalent to the immensely restricted N*, then contradicting Ia and Ib, and then defined through N. N that Classical logic more rigorously can be stated to assume through that Classical logic assumes the so-called Law of double negation (Dl), because N is a necessary presumption fr (the validity of) Dl (provided that Dl not is assumed ad hoc (to assume Dl ad hoc is unserious)), which the following proof of Dl shows given N, because given N it is then valid that:

 

x=y and that y=x (both sentences symmetrically valid, thus also reversely valid):

 

(y)=y, (x)=x (x=y in-substituted in x=y, and y=x in-substituted in y=x):

 

Dl) x=x, y=y.

 

It is thus (the assumption of) N that results in Dl (proof-wise).

 

The foregoing is enough to confute Classical logic, and for that matter of the so-called Intuitionistic logic, which weaker than Classical logic defines the following concerning N:

 

N) x=y; ((y=x)).

 

Thus that x implicatively identically is (implicates) y, bur that y not necessarily implicatively identically is (implicates) x, the reversed can also be defined, for which there is no (conventional) name:

 

N) ((x=y)); y=x.

 

Given Ia and Ib both N end N, except N then, are false, a binding, relation between different x in the way that N/N/N defines simpli-citer not exists (other than as a false x in the brain convolutions), an example:

 

x can give z, or nothing at all (x  x), if x at all be to hand, prevails, x  y can only be a rule/"law" which not is fulfilled (for the mo-ment (x=0)). And y can be given(/implicated) by , which overall can be defined:

 

(x  y)o=((  y)u  ((x  z))), where o defines unfulfilled rule and u defines fulfilled rule.

 

This then especially to compare with the Classically logical equivalent to N* ("N*").

  

Classically logically it complicates in the most horrible way, why the foregoing Classically logically simply not is seen, which can be ex-emplified by Jan Łukasiewicz's proof of Dl (then to be compared with the Dl-proof above) at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_nega-tion, it presupposes in particular the following four sentences:

 

1) x=(y x).

 

2) (x (y z ))=((x y) (x z)).

 

3) (x y)=(y x).

 

4) x=((x y) y).

 

1 and 3 trivially directly follows from N:

 

1) N=x,(y x), so x=(x y).

 

3) Well, it is then valid that x=y and y=x in accordance with N, with which 3 (the "Transposition") trivially follows.

 

4 presupposes Tp as well, except then N:

 

4) x=y=(y y)=((x y) y)(; N=y,(x y), so y=(x y)).