On the other side there is an "empirical" alternative, which is based on the "sense-bubble", takes it for granted (it just only evident is something according to this alternative), for example the part of the bookshelf and open door that faint dark grey can be discerned in the otherwise compact dark when lying in bed before falling to sleep. Definition in this case is of course especially about defining words such as discern, darkness, bookshelf, door, bed, sleep, etcetera. To just take the "discerned", which of course is Something in accordance with the foregoing purely abstract case (had it been Nothing, flat Nothing would have prevailed, and nothing would have been discernible, especially not darkness (Nothing defined as propertiesless, and consequently not having the property darkness, or any other property)), for given, gives no greater guidance in an understanding of the discerned, but for that defining is needed, the discerned specifically be defined to be one or the other.

 

And as said, already before either of these two alternatives there is a choice of definition, a definition, namely then which of these two choices/alternatives which shall be taken as, be defined as starting point? Somewhere it may appear that the "empirical" alternative is the most rational to start from, start in, thus that there is a "sense-bubble", thoughts (a sense sphere), to start analysing/defining (out) from. But already that is then a definition, it goes just as well to start defining without that "sense-bubble assumption", to start in the purely ab-stract with the Nothing ‒ Something distinction (which is more of a "God perspective" than the "empirical" sense-bubble perspective, ev-en if these two perspectives sooner or later merge, in that they deal with the same questions, the same questions sooner or later come up in both alternatives),  even if that starting point then comes to the conclusion that Something must exist in order for something to be defi-ned, a Something which commonly however not needs to be a "sense-bubble" in the previous more specific meaning (as being a thought-sphere).*

 

Anyway, something is to hand, present, not Nothing, according to both of these alternatives, if it is possible to define (especially then the-se two alternatives). A definition which especially can ask itself the question if there are eternal (platonistical) phenomena? Well, it is of course a matter of definition. Given the E-theory there are eternal possibilities, which of course means that a thought perhaps can be taken up again, concerning p (points) for example, but are no p's thought, no p's exists either, because p's (then) not are empirical phenomenon in accordance with the E-theory, by which p not is an eternal phenomenon in platonistical meaning (only E is that (T2), of course including all (eternal; T1) possibilities that E defines, has, owns, so, if it is defined that platonistical x=possibility, possible x, that of course is valid, conventionally though platonistical x are equated with empirical x, although existing in different dimensions, they are seen to be factual phenomena, not only being possibilities (which become factual phenomena if they are thought or maybe are manifested as x={mx} which not are thoughts)), but the E-theory is of course definition. It can (of course, contradicting the E-theory) alternatively be defined that p's are platonistical (eternal) phenomena, empirical or non-empirical, just only (ad hoc) be assumed that that is the case, or after some form of argumentation. But of course, again, definition. It is always about definition:

 

Is it about, exists it just only some given x, beyond (all form of) definition, consciousness, awareness, then it (of course) does so (especi-ally given Ip, but if Ip is assumed, then it of course is a matter of definition, with basis on the defined Ip, not a matter of some given x), and x can have significance (especially for an individual, thinking especially of some disease), but is x not defined (outmost through the definition/assumption that there exists given eternal x, but it is not possible to define a single such x), then x of course is that (not defi-ned), not something conscious, not something defined, by which x simpliciter is unconscious, undefined, by which x of course is comple-tely meaningless (until x maybe begins to be experienced (then maybe through a disease), and x with that of course can be given at least an introductory definition, maybe only x, but it is of course still a matter of a definition, albeit rudimentary). If x nevertheless, as comple-tely unconscious, undefined, wants to be seen to have significance, be meaningful, then it again is a matter of some kind of definition (of x), for example then that x exists, but it is not possible to define a single x (more specifically), which specifically is a completely mean-ingless definition, then concerning (always) completely unconscious x. If it not is at hand, present in an existing definition, but then it of course already is a matter of a definition (about a definition in a definition):

 

To commonly want to give completely unconscious, undefined x (which in no way are more specifically defined, other than maybe com-monly defined to exist, but without any specific definition whatsoever) meaning is completely meaningless.

 

Commonly are only more specifically defined x, albeit only rudimentarily defined x, meaningful x.

 

These two sentences are of course definition, just as it is definition to (contradicting these two sentences) define completely unconscious, undefined x to be meaningful x (that is to define the existence of an empiri, or of platonistical x, without specifically defining it/them):

 

Everything is definition.

 

__________

*  The Nothing – Something distinction is a much more common distinction than a direct assumption of a "sense-bubble", but the former assumption leads E-theoretically developed to the latter, then a "sense-bubble" defined to be a {mx}: Given an ad hoc assumption of a "sense-bubble" it can further be assumed that the "sense-bubble" is the one and only that can be trusted (Empiricism), but as already said must for meaningful analysis that which is experienced, assumed (x), be assumed to be that which is assumed, experienced (x=x), an "Ip"-principle must be assumed, otherwise x simpliciter not needs to be x (((x=x)), or identically: ((x≠x))): Rationalism is rationally what is valid. Which of course not means that the thought (rationally) is free to wander no matter how, but it really is about finding (out) what is rational, and this work then particularly important/fundamental finds Up.^

 

^ The "sense-bubble" either can be trusted, or not. It can be itself enough, or refer to, correspond to something else. And what is assumed to be valid then depends on the assumption(s), especially then on an "Ip"-assumption, that that which is assumed (regarding the "sense-bubble") is that which is assumed (regarding the "sense-bubble"). Intuitively "underlying" is something categorical valid regarding the "sense-bubble", maybe that it not exists, impossible to know, the "sense-bubble", or whatever it is that experiences, assumes (phenome-na), just only knows (of) the assumptions (building on experience, experiencing (regarding the phenomena)) it makes (especially then E-theoretically, in accordance with the "sense-bubble" then is a {mx}).