The Fundamental logical principles

 

The general axiom (Up, with its direct implicative identities (Ip/Kp/Up’))

 

Up) x=y=[unique x]; [{x’}Îx]=[{x’}Îy]:

 

Ip) x=x=[unique x]; [{x’}Îx]=[{x’}Îx].

 

Kp) x≠y; [{x’}Îx]≠[{x’}Îy].

 

Up’) ¦(x)=x.

 

The general rule of inference (Implicative identity)

 

Ii) x=x’; x’Îx intensionally.

 

Theorems

 

T1) Nothing= propertieslessness not exists (at all); Nothing (as a concept) is an absurd p-superpositionality:

 

Up’’) x={x’}:

 

x≠{x’}±q (holism/meridioism not exists (other than (perhaps) as irrational concepts in the thought)):

 

FT) Undecidable/independent (non-axiomatic, non-derivable, holistical) sentences x’=qÎ[theory x] not exists.

 

T2) E=World=∞*; ∞*=[smallest infinity (in all directions)]:

 

x<∞*; x≠E; xÎE (® all x(≠E) are finite; Possible x=E always exists, are eternal (=∞*)).

 

 

"Empirical" axioms

 

1) E can only initiate E-contractions (outmost creating mx (smallest x), E cannot (locally) "ignite virtual particles ("mx")").

 

2) mx is "dead" not very advanced things.

 

Up’’’) x’=y’; [{z}Îx’Îx]=[{z}Îy’Îy] (equal is equal in different x).

 

4) mx have attraction force (to hold together more firmly).

 

5) Thrusting mx "transfers directional information" to thrusted mx, to reasonably "jump" in a thrusting mx "jump"-direction.

 

 

 

Addition III

 

The two most important principles of this work, Up and T1, just only defines (elementary) physics, a physics which (further developed) greatly deviates from what conventionally is assumed, which close to makes it impossible to not mention Physics, would nearest be arro-gant.

 

One thing not mentioned earlier is that Physics especially assumes that "still" x in "pure" space continues to move indefinitely if x gets a puff that causes x to start moving, especially "mx". Which of course not is valid in accordance with the E-theory, because of the "jump"-property; Especially because the Physics of course also (contradicting that) assumes that Everything moves with c (the speed of light) in accordance with the theories of relativity.

 

Another oddity in Physics is that it just only takes angled (collision-)movements for granted, not explains why for example a billiard ball (according to the "empiri") moves in different angles depending on how it is hit (by another billiard ball), which E-theoretically then is explained by the direction of the Fr-movement (FrÎx) and how the Fr-movement attraction-wise is affected by the residual (Îx) to the Fr-movement and that thrusting mx pass directional information over to thrusted mx; Fundamentally it is how collisions between "mx" look like, is defined, that explain (thrust-)movement, it cannot (rationally) be explained, seen from some overall-perspective, but it must down to "mx"-level, and (given the "empiri") an explanation be given of how colliding "mx" moves (after colliding), but there Physics is silent, especially not talks about any transfer of information (between colliding "mx"), which it on the other hand talks about when "mx" exists at a distance from each other ("(quantum) entanglement"), and can "mx" "speak" to each other at a distance, then they of course also can "talk" to each other close to each other, for example then in a collision. So therein perhaps the Physical explanation lies, even if then this that "mx" can "speak", "communicate" with each other E-theoretically is absurd, it only under (presumed) "empirical" constraint is assu-med that colliding mx (which "jump" into each other) "talks" to each other, that however definitely not at a distance from each other.

 

Even the mystical/holistical interaction of Physics can be mentioned over again, which then defines "mx" being able to attract each other without having any attraction force themselves, which rationally means that it must be about mx being able to physically grab hold of each other, especially by sending satellites (a) out which can grab hold of other mx and drag them towards (mother-)mx, which the Phy-sics then neither, at least not literally, assumes it is about, why it then is about holism(/mysticism).

 

It is the particle-concept that gives rise to the problems surrounding mx, but the alternative is that everything that belongs together really belongs together, is one, a continuously one, any voids between "mx" are one with "mx", it is about thickening and thinning (in a homo-geneously/continuously "field"), which given the mv-concept means that mv flows into or out of each other, or for more compact than mv, that this more compact flows into or out of each other, and this compact is (rationally) simpliciter separate from each other if it is se-parate from each other, it is nothing but separate phenomena, separate x (outmost mx(/"mx")), so, no, the particle-concept cannot rational-ly be abandoned; The fact that mv or more compact than that flows into or out of each other can the particle-concept given be seen to oc-cur in space-contractions, in unstable mx, if any, and at completion, when (stable) mx dissolves into mv (by cleaving (of mx) or by (off-)separating (from mx)).

 

All can take its beginning in Ia and Ib

 

Which more commonly can be defined:

 

((x,y,z,.. ® å,ä,ö,..)).

 

Thus x,y,z,.. can perhaps give å,ä,ö,...

 

If x is assumed to could be Nothing, then immediately the T1-question arises if x=Nothing can give y≠Nothing, and vice versa. Nothing which rationally is propertiesless, nowt (not anything), otherwise Nothing of course is something (not nowt), something with (characte-rizing) properties:

 

Nothing=propertieslessness.

 

x=properties; x≠Nothing (at least one property ("properties"<1, for example half a property, is a property (or two))).

 

Nothing that (per definition) not even have the property (to be) nowt(/propertieslessness), but of course is nowt (having the property pro-pertieslessness) as being nowt, and with that is/defines an absurd p-superpositionality, which then defines T1.

 

T1 which further then defines E (T2), E in which Ia and Ib of course are valid, but then without x=Nothing being valid in E (given T1), but the outmosts(/"extremes") are defined by 0 (empty room):

 

0 ® x.

 

If x=0, then 0 (unchanged) simpliciter is 0:

 

(0 ® 0)=(0=0), which can be commonalized (or "generalized" in this particular case): (x ® x)=(x=x).

 

If x≠0, then there are two interpretation alternatives, creation (in space contractions, given the E-theory), or false implication, "0" impli-cates x, ex ante y(≠0) maybe was seen to implicate x, but after revision (ex post) "0". Here it is easy wanting to see "0" as Nothing, but given T1 it is the matter of 0.

 

x ® 0.

 

Can be interpreted in three ways, either that x(≠0) is completed (x turns into being empty room), or that x implicates "0", x ex ante maybe was seen to implicate y(≠0) but ex post is stated to implicate "0"(=0 given T1, y≠0 was false), or that x (flat) not implicates anything.

 

x ® y; x,y≠0.

 

Regarding this it is then valid that one or more (different) x can implicate one or more (different) y, or perhaps no y, by which y of course is 0 (x ® 0 in the third meaning):

 

Interpretation/definition is extremely important, formulas not defines themselves (which not least is shown by that the foregoing "simple" relationships not are so "simple", this although so to speak more in the beginning, given an (assumed) basis it can then further be easier, the definition more or less "give itself", see further the directly following).

 

Then it then further can be specified, especially then regarding Up with its implicative consequences, and regarding E.

 

Given E (especially after assumption of T2) it is not that difficult to progress in an (E-)definition. But what if E not is assumed? Well, so-mething has to be assumed, otherwise it simpliciter is impossible to define anything. But if one now hasn’t E, how then do?

 

Well, for example Principia Mathematica then sets up 2-7 (see that section), as obviously, or intuitively valid, in the empiri (are they not presupposed being valid in the empiri, then they of course not are that (given that what is assumed also is assumed, meant), by which they of course are empirically worthless, because the scientifically important is what (maybe) empirically is valid, non-empiri, purely abstract, are more for the sake of fun). Which already discussed are extremely difficult to see any relevance in, especially if they are assumed to presuppose N, which they then are assumed to presuppose, because it is then evident that N has nothing with the "empiri" (the "empiri-cal" experience) to do (there is absolutely nothing in it that says that x(≠0) is true if y(≠0) is false, and vice versa, other than some people that claims it), and has N not that it is hardly a great probability for N to have anything with the empiri (that which perhaps corresponds to the "empiri") to do.

 

Physics more directly seeks to go on the "empirical" experience, but in doing that it of course uses interpretation principles, especially important it presupposes that that which is out-interpreted (x) is that which is out-interpreted (x, an "Ip"-principle). The mathematics also is an important interpretative instrument for Physics, which (of course) makes Physics being something very (purely) abstract: E-theore-tically, if there exists (is assumed to exist) a cluster of mx (including mx properties, for example then attraction force, or that mx can thrust each other), then it just only does so, it is not mathematically possible to "calculate" with/on mx, for that the mathematics (or some other interpretation basis) must be assumed, which of course raises the question if the mathematics "calculates" correctly with mx? Which it either (unseriously) ad hoc can be assumed to do, or then (seriously) the (mx-)mathematics has to be sought to be tested against the  "empiri". The mathematics maybe calculates that y is valid given x (x ® y), in which case that "empirically" of course has to be tried to be verified/controlled, that (equivalently) y ("empirically") is the result if (equivalently) x ("empirically") is valid. And the mathematics can ("empirically") begin to be trusted if it seems that x ® y "empirically" occurs every time x is present. Yes, the reliability of the math-ematics is rationally entirely dependent on that its results can be "empirically" controlled/verified. Per se, the mathematics has no value whatsoever, because it is based on pure abstraction (especially on the assumption of the existence of superclones (contradicting Up’, but also intuitively the existence of superclones (different identical x) is completely absurd)).*

 

__________

* Even if there are cases in which it rationally in accordance with Up’’’ can be assumed to be valid, an example: In accordance with the E-theory x consisting of exactly the same number of mx "weighs" exactly the same (as clusters of mx ({mx}), because mx are exactly equal), by which it of course is rational to define (in accordance with Up’’’) these "weights" of x to be identical, to be one and the same "weight", despite these "weights" ({mx}) of course exists in different places, are different.